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PREFACE 
During the twenty year period between the Versailles settlement and 
the collapse of the European security system Czechos lovakia alone among 
the new states of Europe developed a viable democratic order . Yet with-
in less than three years after the conclusion of the second World War this 
"model democracy" was overthrown in a coup d'etat by the Communist party 
with the support of the par liamentary majority and the organized working 
class . Czechos lovakia is the only democratic republic that has been 
subverted successfully by Communist s , and the only country that the 
Communist s have captured without either recourse to civil warfare--as 
in Russia, China, Yugos lavia and Vietnam--or to the intervention of the 
Soviet armed forces--as in the numerous satellite states of Europe and 
Asia which came under Russian occupation in the wake of the war against 
the Axis . 
This thesis i s an attempt to analyse the event s which led to the 
demise of democracy in Czechos lovakia in February, 1948, and to discern 
the causes for the weakening of the democratic ideology, the spread of 
Communist influence, and the failure of the legal and political safe-
guards to preserve the constitutional order of the state. 
It is the opinion of the author that the root s of the crisis of 
democracy in Czechoslovakia ste:rraned from the "betrayal of Munich ;! in 
1938, when the French and British creators and allies of Czechos lovakia 
accomodated Hitler' s demands for the dismemberment of Czechos lovakia 
in violation of numerous solemn treaty commitments which guaranteed the 
iii 
inviolability of that country's territorial integrity. The appeasement 
policy of the western powers shook the faith of the Czechos l ovaks in the 
democratic heritage and contributed to the propagation of pan-Slavism 
and to the idealization of Soviet Russia during the course of the conflict 
against Hitler. This sentiment of reliance and trust in Russi an protec-
tion paved the way for the Czechos lovak Communist s and their supporters 
to win the adherence of the working class in 1946. 
It i s also the opinion of the author that Allied wartime diplomacy 
again ''betrayed" the democratic government in exile of Pres ident Benes 
by accomodating to the Russian demands that Czechos lovakia be liberated 
by the Red Army, that its government include only leaders who were 
acceptable to Moscow, and that the Czech Communist s be given pos itions 
of power and responsibility within the administration. This infiltration 
of the administrative structure of the state by the Communists became 
the lever by which an activist minority of the population was armed and 
directed for the seizure of total power within Czechos l ovakia . 
I would like to express my s incere appreciation to my major adviser, 
Dr. Clifford A. L. Rich, for his invaluable and untiring guidance in the 
preparations of this thesis . To Dr. Robert O. Gibbon and Dr. Guy R. 
Donnell, I would like to express my s incere appreciat ion for their advice 
and helpful a s sistance. 
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CIIA.P.rER I 
FOUNDATIONS AND COil.APSE OF CZECHOSLOVP..K SEX:URITY 
Diplomatic Foundations of Czechoslovak Security 
Czechos lovakia was established as an independent state by the 
Allied and Associated Powers within the old boundries of Bohemia . In 
carving out the national boundries of the new state from the Hapsburg 
Empire, the Versailles peacemakers were forced to reconcile the prin-
ciple of self determination with the economic and strategic require-
ments of stability. The 3,100,000 res ident Germans who were included 
as citizens of the new st ate by the Treaty of Saint Germain had formed 
an integral population of Bohemia from the beginning of the thirteenth 
century when their immigration was encouraged by the Czech kings . 
They lived in eight territorially disconnected areas of Czechos lovakia , 
so that geographically they did not form a compact community. There 
was no consensus among them as to their future affiliat i on, as some 
preferred annexation by Austria , others sought inclusion into Germany, 
while many expressed acceptance of autonomous status within Czechoslo-
vak:la . 1 
The Peace Conference gave no consideration t o the des ires of the 
German minority in Bohemia, due to the active participation of the 
Czechoslovakian military units in the war against the Central Powers , 
~ - F . Kaspar, ~ Without Sudeten Germans (Paris, 1953), p. 11. 
1 
2 
and the Frenr::h desire to contain and balance Germany' ,; power thro-u.gh 
limitation of her territorial extent and population. To safeguard the 
i nterest ~, of the German-:,peaking minority of the Czechos lovakian 
Republic , the latter was forced to submit to internationa l 3ervitudes, 
which were incorporated into the Treaty of Saint Germain and enforced 
by the League of Nations . 
Czechos lovakia not only respected the internationally-gt,aranteed 
rights o:f the German minority, but conferred numerous additional legal 
rights and privileges upon this group in order to win it :3 loyalty to 
2 the new Republic . The universal suffrage act of 1919 provided for 
proportional representation in both Houses of Parliament and guaranteed 
l ocal i elf-government to all d:l3trids with a German majority. The new 
Constitution and the Law of Nationalities of 1920 insured legal protec-
t ion of the .nati on, racial, and religi ous r i ghts of minorities and 
prohibited a l l di:3criminst i on. Separate schools staffed by German-
speaking teachers were provided for a s f ew as forty pupils, while 
German-language l ibrari es were establ i shed in all towns having over four 
hundred German-Czech residents . Even a separate German university in 
Prague was established. In 1930 the German language was officially 
recognized in distri cts inhabited by 2,338,000 Germans . Ninety- seven 
per cent of the German children attended German- language schools , which 
averaged one per e i ght hundred fifty- two inhabitants, which was higher 
than the Pruss ian average . 3 The Ministry of Education spent fou.,_-teen 
2 R. W. Seton-Wats on, ! History ~~Czechs and Slovaks (London, 
1943), p . 327. 
3Jaromir Luza, Transfer (Vienna, no year ) , p. 6. 
3 
per cent per capita more for students in the German univer~ity than for 
those i n the Czechoslovakian universities . Czechoslovakia guaranteed 
instruction in the languages of all the constituent peoples of the 
Republic, a privilege which the Czechs had not enjoyed under Austrian 
4 rule . 
For fifteen years there was little friction between Czech3 and 
Germans , as the trust and loyalty of the Germanfl were won by the new 
Republic, thanks to the enlightened domestic and f oreign polic ies of t he 
Masaryk government . Czechoslovakia' s foreign minister during the 
twenties, Dr. Edward Benes , supported the admiss ion of Germany to the 
League of Nations and. offered to vacate membershi p on the League Council 
in favor of' Germany 1n 1925. He welcomed the Locarno pact of October 
16, 1925, and included a separate treaty with the Weimar Republic to 
arbitrate all future disputes between the two states . 5 As a result , 
the democratic and constitutional parties of Czechoslovakia received 
more than two-thirds of the German minority vote i n the elections of 
1925 and 1929. After 1926 the German Agrarian and German Clerical 
parties, :followed by the German Social Democratic party, became active 
collaborators o~ the governmental coalition, sharing respons ibility 
within the Cabinet until the spring of 1938, when they withdrev under 
the pressure o:f the Nazi movement . Only a small minority of the Czecho-
s lovakian Germans remained irreconcilably opposed to the Repub lic , to 
4 s . Harrison Thompson , Czechos lovakia in European History {Princeton, 
1953), p. 346. 
5Edward B. Hitchcock, I Built~ Temple of Peace (New York, 1950), 
p . 236. 
4 
become the breedi ng nest of irredentism and Nazism, and to provide Hitler 
with moral rationalization to dismember Czechos lovakia. 6 
The Paris conf'erence of 1919-20 established a new status quo i n 
Europe that was based partly upon the democratic principle of sel f 
determination and partly upon the punitive principle of retribution 
vi s -a-vis the Central Powers , all of whom were stripped of territories .• 
The new order had to be en:forced by an adequate system of power) for a~ 
Poincare opined of Germany in 1922, "They will return". 7 France was 
not capable alone of enforcing the new peace in Europe, f or she emerged 
greatly weakened f rom the war in 1918 . Her effort to concl ude a t r iple 
alliance with the United States and Great Britain fai l ed , a s the United 
States Senate r ejected the proposal at the same t i me it re:f'used to 
authorize t he ratification of the League of Nations Covenant. The 
British government a l so declined to commit i tself to an alliance with 
France as a result of the Ameri can refusa l. Unable to obtain an un-
equivocal pledge of adequate military a s s i stance :from these sources , 
France sought to concl ude alliances with the successi on states of central 
and eastern Europe, whose security van a l so threatened by Germany. 
Among these countri es was Czechoalovakia, to whom overtures for a 
treaty of mutual assistance were made i n 1923 by the Paris government . 
I nitially, the president of the Czechoslovak Republic, T. G. 
Masaryk, was not at all enthusi astic towards the proposal, for he in-
tended to keep aloof from the influence o:f any s ingle great power and 
preferred to develop the Little Entente a s an i ndependent bl oc in 
6J. O. ST. Clair-Sobell, "Post -War Czechoslovakia," I nternational 
Journal, III (1948), p . 356. 
7No Author, Ideas of Polit icians {Prague, 1927 ) , p. 117 . 
5 
8 international politi cs . On the other hand, the Czechs had strong sym-
pathies for the French and were mindf'ul that France was the fir st of t he 
great powers to support the Czechoslovak national cause in 1918 , and to 
ins i st firmly on the creation of t he Czechoslovak state. 
The Franco-Czechoslovak alliance was s i gned on January 25, 1924 . 
Its main purpose was to defend the status quo resul t i ng from the 
Versailles settlement and to consult on all internationa l problems t hat 
might threaten the securi ty of the s i gnatories . The treaty required 
j oi nt agreement on the speci f ic measures 'Which should be taken t o protect 
their comm.on interest in security and peace. The treaty re -affirmed 
opposition t o any Austro-German union, and to the restoration of either 
the Hapsburgs or the Hohenzollerns to thei r former territ ori e s . Both 
parties promised t o i nf'orm each other of all treaties to whi ch they 
were a party and to consult one another before conc l udi ng any new ones . 9 
The treaty did not provide for any plan of concerted military action or 
military cooper ation . This omission was purposely made i n order not to 
provoke any counter a lliances and to lessen international resentment . 
However , a permanent military mission vas mai ntai ned by the French i n 
Prague from 1919 to 1938 to plan for concerted military action in the 
10 event of future war against Germany. I n order to bol ster her securi ty 
further, after the Locarno pact of October 16, 1925, France concl uded 
8 Ka.mil Krofta, Czechos lovakia in the International Police (Prague , 
1934 ), p . 79. - -
9v. Vochoc, "Our Alliance with France , " The International Polit i c3, 
III (1925), pp . 1-6. 
10K.arel Lis icky, The Czechos lovak~ to Muni ch (London, 1956) , 
pp. 9-12 . 
6 
additional treaties with her east European allies, including Czechoslovakia, 
whereby mutual aid was promised in all cases of unprovoked attack. 
Another goal of Czech diplomacy was to strengthen the League of 
·Nati ons, collective security and international law. These were vital 
objectives for a small and insecure nation bounded by powerful revisionist 
states. Enf'orcement by an effective League of Nations of the rights of 
small states was viewed as an important guarantee of Czech independence 
and territorial integrity. Dr. Benes believed that Czechoslovakia as 
well as other small states could enjoy security only in a fully stabilized 
Europe, and that the League . of Nati ons uas the only agency that could 
adjust differences between the Great Powers. The League, he hoped, would 
furnish Czechoslovakia with security and prevent her from becoming a 
11 satellite of one of the Great Powers. Benes became one of the strongest 
advocates of the League and collective security. 
In regard to Germany, Czechoslovakia' s foreign policy ·was one of 
rapprochement. 12 A:f'ter the abortive Geneva Protocol, to which Benes 
had contributed significantly, he welcomed Stresemann ' s offer to partici-
pate in the negotiation of a modus vivendi that would recognize the status 
quo in Europe.. Benes' opinion of the Locarno Pact was that : "it should 
inaugurate a new period of peace--whi ch would be universal, or at least 
European in scope,. "13 
1~dward Benes, The Struggle for Peace and the Security of the State 
(1934), pp. 7-17. - - - - - -
12 J. Krcmar, "Contributions to the Interpretation and Evaluation of 
Locarno Treaties," The International Politics , 'rY (1925), pp. 1332-133~· .• 
Geneva Protocol of Sept . 6, 1924--an attempt to prevent all aggressive 
wars by means of clear def inition and an aggressor, provisions for sanc -
tion and alliances, and compulsory arbitration. The rejection of Great 
Britain doomed it. 
7 
Czechoslovakia sought, a s yet another goal of her diplomacy, the 
establishment of close political and economic ties with the other states 
of eastern Europe which had benefited from the Versailles sett lement and 
were therefore interested in the defense of the status ~ and balance of 
power in Europe . Benes announced his a im t o negotiate "a new system of 
planned collaborati on" with Yugos lavia, Rumania, and Greece in 1919. 14 
As the result of the negotiationn, three separate bilateral treaties were 
s i gned in 1920 and 1921 between Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, Czechos l o-
vakia and Rumania, and Ru.mania and Yugoslavia. The alliances formed 
what became known as the Little Entente. 
All of these treaties, which were identical in their content, speci-
fied that: (1) each state was to aid the other against an unprovoked 
attack by Hungary, (2) the method of assi stance would be determined by 
a later agreement between the competent technical authorities, i.e., by 
a military protocol, (3) neither country might conc lude an alliance with 
a third power without informing the partners in advance, (4) the treaties 
were to be renewable every two years, and (5) the treaties were to be 
registered with the League of Nati ons . 15 
Benes believed that the Little Entente would establish closer 
economic cooperation, greater internal stability, and lead to a regional 
understanding that would replace the role of the Austro-Hungarian empire 
in maintaining an equilibrium of law and order among the diverse nation-
alities of east-central Europe . 16 The economic discussions which 
, l~ 
- Josef Hane , Tornado Across Eastern Europe (New York, 1942), p . 60 . 
l5R. Machray, The Little Entente (London, 1929), pp . 105-106 . 
16 Edward Benes, The Problems of New Europe (Prague, 1924), 
pp . 284-285. 
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accompanied the negotiation of the alliances resulted in the signature 
of commercial conventions betveen Czechos l ovakia and Yugoslavi a . 
The Little Entente was directed primarily against the Hungari ans , 
who were known to harbor revis ionist aims that were incompatible with 
the interests of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Rumania. The Hungarian 
plot to restore the f ormer Hapsburg monarch in 1926 was quickly frustrated 
by the Little Entente, which threatened intervention. The Little Entente 
also supported F.rance in opposing the Austro-German customs union of 1931.17 
The rlaz i revolution of 1933 and Germany ' s nevr challenge to the 
status quo caused the foreign ministers of the Entente countries to con-
elude a treaty in Geneva, on February 16, 1933, whereby their mutual ties 
were strengthened. A Permanent Council of Foreign Minister s was cren.ted 
to ensure unity in the prosecution of a common for eign policy. Benes 
explained to the Foreign Aff'airs Connnittee of the Czechoslovak Parliament 
that the pact vras necessary to check the spread of internal political 
chaos in Centra l Europe, and provide for greater security in the event 
t he disarmament con:ference in Geneva should fail and lead to an armaments 
. E 18 r ace in • urope . 
The Permanent Council of the Little Entente met in Prague i n June, 
1933, to create an Economic Council, whose main purpose was to establish 
a. preferential tariff system for the three states , propose a. common 
economic policy, and create immediately a "npeci al normalization committee 
which would extend to all branches of military equi pment . 1119 
17Gerhard Schacher, Central Europe and the Western World (New York, 
1936), p . 143. - -
18 
Edward Benes, The Struggle for Peace ~ ~ Security ~ the State 
(Prague, 1934), pp . 6SS:-691. 
l 9Gerhard Schacher, Central Europe and the Western Worl d (New York, 
1936), p . 93. - -
9 
The reorganized Little Entente formed a relatively powerful bloc in 
1933. It was numerically the third largest military power in Europe after 
the Soviet Union and France. On the other hand, it displayed certain 
weaknesses, particularly in the multi-national composition of' the popula-
tions, one-fourth of which consisted of minorities, and in the limited 
scope of its collective security provisions, which guaranteed mutual 
assistance only against unprovoked agression by Hungary. In the autumn 
of 1936, however, President Benes made an attempt to supplant the separate 
bilateral treaties with a s ingle multilateral pact ·which would guarantee 
to each signatory mutual military and economic assistance against any 
unprovoked attack. He proposed, too, that the Entente conclude an alliance 
with France for mutual security against Germany and Italy. Benes' pro-
posal was turned dmm, for the governments of Rumania and Yugosl avi a had 
doubts about the utility of an alliance with France, because the latter' s 
display of weakness and inaction against Nazi re-militarization of t he 
Rhineland in the spring of the same year, and because they did not feel 
any immediate threats from Germany to their awn national security. An 
official visit to Yugoslavia in 1937 by President Benes to plead for 
strengthening of the Little Entente was unsuccessful. 20 
The idea of recognizing the l egitimacy of the Soviet regime and 
admitting it to the concert of powers in Europe for the purpose of 
strengthening the status quo was espoused by Benes during the twenties, 
but without success . Czechosl ovakia was prevented from establishing 
diplomatic relations with the Soviet government by the opposition of 
several of the parties 1dlich formed the maj ority coalition. A trade 
20Karel Lis i cky, The Czechos l ovak Road to Munich (London, 1955), 
pp. 23-24. -- -
10 
agreement was concluded in the wake of the Rapallo conference in 1922, 
and in 1928 a Soviet exposition of Russian products was held in Prague . 
There were increasing pressures from Czech manufacturers and exporters 
to recognize the Soviet government a~er 1931, when the depression created 
a stimulus to expand trade with Russia . It was not until the conclusion 
of the Franco-Soviet non-agression pact of 1933 that the impetus to 
formalize relations with the USSR was able to override previous objec-
tions . The admission of Soviet Russia into the League of Nations in 1934 
established its respectability among the Western Powers, and its energetic 
contribution to the policy of collective security to halt the march of 
the Fascist powers towards war enabled the Czech Foreign :Minister to win 
the consent of Parliament for the de jure recognition of the USSR in 
June 1934.21 
Increas ing tension 1n Czech-Germ.an relations raised fears of aggres-
sion and induced the Czechoslovak government in 1935 to prepare a compre-
hensive plan of aerial defense and to strengthen its alliances . In the 
absence of united strength by the French and British to contain Germany, 
Benes was forced to seek additional security :for his country in an 
alliance with the Soviet Union . Signature of a treaty of mutual assis-
tance between France and the USSR at Paris on May 2, 1935 made it possi-
ble for Czechoslovakia to add Russia as an ally against Germany. Relations 
between Prague and Moscow had become very cordial following the appointment 
of diplomatic missions . Czech journalists were welcomed in Moscow and 
were received with unusual sincerity. Two new Soviet-Czechoslovakia 
commercial conventions providing for most-favored-nation treatment were 
2~11 Krofta, Czechoslovakia in International Politics (Prague, 
1934), p . 121. 
11 
signed early in 1935 and paved the way for the negotiation of the Treaty 
of Mutual Assistance between Czechoslovakia and Russia of May 16, 1935. 
The pact vas to be invoked whenever one of the signatories became 
the victim of unprovoked attack by any European state, and provided for 
mutual as sistance against the aggressor . It was conditioned by the 
protocol of signature which stated that "both governments understood that 
the obligation of mutual a ssistance becomes effective only when it shall 
meet the forseen conditions of the pact and when the victim of aggression 
shall receive also the aid of France . "22 
On November of the same year Benes , in summarizing his foreign policy 
before Parliament, concluded that Czechos lovakia was endangered by her 
geographical location. He linked his country's security t o the balance 
of power and general peace of the European continent . 
"Our State is the key to the whole post-War structure of 
Central Europe . If it is touched either internally or inter-
nationally, the whole fabric of Central Europe i s menaced, 
and the peace of Europe seriously infringed. It would not 
be long ere all Europe would be grievously conscious of the 
fact . It is for that reason that today and for all fUture 
our international position and our internal stability are a 
matter of great interest equally to France and the Soviet 
Union, equally to England and Italy, and to the Little Entente 
as they ought to be to Germany and Poland. Thus, whenever we 
are in danger the vital interest of all the constructive forces 
of Europe would be on the side of our integrity and our pros-
perity. 1123 
His conduct of the nation' s foreign policy was approved with enthusi-
a sm by Parliament, and in recognition of his statesmanship, a month later, 
just before Christmas, he succeeded Masaryk as President of Czechoslovakia. 
2~ederick Schuman, Europe S?!:. ~ ~ (New York, 1939), p . 561. 
23Edward Benes, The Struggle for Peace and the Collective Security 
of the state (Prague, 1936}, p . 58. - -
12 
Hitler and the Breakdown of Czechoslovak Security 
The rise to power of Hitler in Germany undermined the strength of 
the democratic parties in the German-speaking regions of Czechoslovakia, 
although the prolonged economic depression of the early thirties had 
prepared the German-speaking population for a conversion to political 
extremism. In the 1935 elections the Nazi party of Konrad Henlein polled 
62 per cent of the total German vote in Czechoslovakia. Al ~hough the 
Czechoslovakian government was providing financial assistance to the 
German-speaking areas to ameliorate their economic hardship, pan-Germruii6!ll 
and union with the Third Reich became the panacea for all ills among the 
majority of the German population of Czechoslovakia . 
The 1935 electoral triumph of' the Sudeten Nazis, however, did not 
force the German democratic representatives to withdraw from the Cabinet, 
nor did it affect Czech-German diplomatic relations immediately. On the 
contrary, Hitler made overtures in 1935 and 1936 to the Benes government 
for the conclusion of a treaty of amity, territorial guarantee and mutual 
24 non-aggression. Germany did not assert any demands on behalf of the 
German-speaking minority of Czechoslovakia a s late as December, 1936. 
President Benes recognized that the prospective treaty aimed to drive a 
wedge between Czechoslovakia and her allies, France and Soviet Russia, 
and to induce the Republic to l eave the League of Nations, consequences 
which would have i solated Czechoslovakia diplomatically and left her 
exposed to subsequent German pressures . Following French advice, the 
Benes government declined the terms of the proposed pact .25 
24 Charles Hodges, "Benes Ends an Era," Current History, XLIX (1938), 
p . 25. 
25Ibid. 
13 
In the spring of 1937 Naz i propaganda for the first time begnn to 
denounce Czechoslovakia for alleged mistreatment of the German minority, 
and accused her of being a "bastion of Bolshevism" . Both allegations 
aimed to influence world public opinion against Czechoslovakia, so as to 
i solate and expose her to German conquest. Hitler informed his govern-
ment aides of his plan to annex Austria and Czechos lovakia at this time, 
26 by means of diplomatic pressure and military force if required. After 
the annexation of Austria on March 12, 1938, the Czechos lovakian govern-
ment was assured several times by Nazi spokesmen that Germany had no 
intention to conmdt aggression against the Republic, and Reich Marschal 
Goering re-asserted the validity of the 1925 treaty of arbitration, 
while at the same time the irredentist movement 1n Czechos lovakia among 
the German minority was loudly demanding cession of the "Sudetenland" 
to Germany. The Benes government made several compromise offers to the 
irredentist leader Henlein, the last of which, on September 6, 1938, 
would have granted complete autonomy to the Germans of Czechoslovakia, 
but Henlein refused each of them categorically, since his demands for 
political autonomy of the Sudetenland were simply a preteA't to goad the 
Benes government into a policy of' repression 'Which might then justify a 
27 German invasion and annexation of the region to the Reich. 
The collective security system and the prestige of the League of 
Nations went untested during the twenties, but from 1931 to 1936 a sequence 
of' events marked by treaty renunciations, aggressions, and conquests on 
the part of Japan, Germany and Italy undermined and shattered the Covenant 
26Henry C. Wolf, "The New Czechoslovakia, 11 The Commentator, rv 
(1938 ), p . 28. ~ 
27Radomir Luza, Transfer (Vienna, no year), p . 11. 
14 
and the effectiveness of the new international law which it had engendered. 
The effectiveness of the Franco-Czech Alliance remained unimpaired until 
the Munich perioc1. Following Germany' s re-militarization of the Rhine-
land i n 1936 the French were reminded that "only ?!'ague was l oyal and 
28 would remain loyal even unto death" . President Benes immediately 
assured the French Ambassador in Prague that the Czechoslovak army lTaS 
prepared to enforce the provisions of the Franco-Czechoslovak treaty and 
those of the Covenant of the League of Nations . Unfortunately the French 
Cabinet decided against applying force against Germany, but acce1)ted the 
advice of the British to deliver a diplomatic protest to Germany and to 
the League of Nations . The success of Hitler' s bluff in re -militarizing 
the Rhineland, a..'1.d the failure of France to act, might be considered as 
the turning point in the relations between France and her eastern 
european allies, 29 for in the autumn of 1937 French Foreign .Minister 
Yvonne Delbos reported to the Chamber of' Deputies that, although France 
still had friends in eastern Europe, only Czechos lovakia could be expected 
to fulfill any military commitments . 
Pres ident Benes was awe.re of the profound crisis in France which 
might obscure the ju~nt 0£ her leaders and prevent them :from acting 
in their own interests; so after the outbreak of the crisis in Czech-
German relations, President Benes informed the French government through 
its ambassador in Prague that the Nazi claims against Czechoslovakia 
imperiled Europea..--i security and the balance of power, and that it was in 
the interest of France to oppose Hitler's demands . He asked for assurances 
that France would uphold her conmlitments to defend Czechoslovakia . The 
28 · 
Josef Hane, Tornado Across Eastern Europe (New York, 1942), p . 159 
15 
French foreign minister, Georges Bonnet, inf'ormed the Czechoslovakian 
ambassador in Paris that the international situation had changed and 
that France could no longer pursue her former policy of territorial 
containment against Germany, and that Czechoslovakia should acknowledge 
German power and accede to her territorial demands . 30 
An authoritative admission of the collapse of collective security -was 
made by Prime Minister Chamberlain to the House of COillillons , on February 
22, 1938, when he warned such countries as Austria and Czechoslovakia not 
to be deceived into believing that the League of Nations would defend 
them against attack. Thus, on the eve of her crisis vTith Hitler, Czecho-
slovakia witnessed the collapse of another of the pillars of' her foreign 
policy. 3l Although the head of French delegation at Geneva, Paul Boncour, 
30Ed.ward Benes, The Day s of Munich (London, 1955), p . 9. 
3lin a lecture which he delivered on July 10, 1939, in the United 
States , Benes recalled: "And so, after the long and successful fight 
for the building of the system of collective security s i nce 1922, we see 
since 1931 the progressive downfall of the same system and of the League. 
All that has happened since 1931 could, of course, have been avoided. I 
very definitely contest the idea that there have not been honest attempts 
for the peaceful settlement of European problems, very great concess ions 
for Germany, real, honest ideas and programs for the maintenance of peace, 
and honest representatives of different st ates who wished to save peace 
on the basis of justice--justice which never can be perfect and always 
must be realized step by step in an evolutionary way, without violence. 
But I do admit that in the critical moments of the last years there have 
not been governments sufficiently conscious of their real duties, seeing 
the real substance of events, and understanding the whole European pro-
blem. It was simply impossible to settle the most serious European 
problems by abandoning certain principles or certain nations and through 
the defense only of the limited national interest of certain states as 
they conceived them narrowly and selfi shly. That i s the whole tragedy of 
Europe. The present failure and tragedy came, and in my opinion a greater 
tragedy will come inevitably, because of these great and tragic mistakes 
and failures . The whole moral, political, and economic cri s i s of Europe 
i s just now at the culmination point. The final clash will come sooner 
or later." Edvrard Benes, International Security (Chicago, 1939), 
pp . 73-74. 
. . 
unofficially advised President Benes t o appeal for protection against 
Germany to the League at the height of the cris i s in September 1938, 
the British and French governments convinced him that it would be use-
less . 32 
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The Soviet government supported Czechoslovakia energetically during 
the mounting crisis opened by Hitler in the summer of 1938. Foreign 
Minister Litvinov, in August 1938, warned the German ambassador in 
reference to the Czechs to: 
"Leave them alone . Czechoslovakia would fight to her la.st 
soldier, France i s obliged to come to her innnediate assist-
ance . England, even the Chamberlains , would be forced to 
intervene, and Soviet Russia i s determined to fulfill her 
obligations to the ~jt letter of the Soviet -Czechos l ovakian 
treaty of alliance . " 
The Czechoslovak government posed two direct questions to the Russian 
government in September : (1) Would the Soviets come to the assistance 
of Czechoslovakia if France did so, and (2) Would the Soviets fulfill the 
obligations a s a member of the League of Nations Both questions were 
immediately and unreservedly answered affirmatively. Litvinov thereupon 
summoned a meeting of French, Czechoslovak, and Russian military repre-
sentatives and, speaking in Geneva, condemned the inadequacy of Western 
resistance to Hitler and re-affirmed Russia' s determination to fulfill 
her obligations under the nrutual assi stance pact and the League Covenant . 
Even after Czechoslovakia had been forced to acquiesce to the English-
French plan, which actually abrogated the Soviet-Czechos lovak treaty, 
Litinov again, at Geneva, expressed a willingness to assist Czechos lovakia . 34 
3~el Lisicky, ~Czechos l ovak~ to Munich (London, 1955), p . 22 . 
33Edward Benes, The Days of Munich (London, 1955), pp . 79-96 . 
34Ibid. 
17 
Russia warned Poland, ·who was massing her armed forces on the 
Czechoslovak border, that Sovi et forces would intervene to oppose any 
Polish invas ion of Czechoslovakia . After he realized that the French 
had no intention of fulfilling their connnitments, Benes asked the Soviets 
whether they would assist Czechoslovakia without France. Benes was 
informed that if Czechoslovakia would submit her case to the League of 
Nations, the USSR would support her militarily. President Benes did 
not invoke this last offer, for fear lest the Western powers be duped 
into acceptance of the Nazi propaganda that Czechoslovakia was a hotbed 
of communism, and thereby condone and encourage Hitler to undertake the 
total conquest of his country. 35 
Czechoslovakia did not have any bilateral security agreements with 
Great Britain. The British government stated its positi on on the 
Czechoslovak crisis clearly just a few days before the Austrian Anschluss . 
In answer to a question raised in the House of Commons in March 1938 as 
to what treaty commitments had been given to Czechoslovakia for the 
defence of her independence, the spokesman of the Cabinet replied that 
His Majesty ' s government had only the general obligation of the League 
of Nations Covenant to support Czechoslovakia's security through callee-
tive measures . The Chamberlain Cabinet did not reveal its policy on the 
questions of German threats against Czechoslovakia. . It was well knmm, 
however, th.at the Prime t<tlnister was zealous for peace and fearful that 
35Ibid. For the explanation of the Soviet attitude the preparatory 
notes of Dr. Benes have been consulted. These notes were intended for 
the elaboration of a definitive explanation of the Munich crisis . These 
notes were published by the Benes Institute in London in 1955. The 
chapter about the Soviet Union and Czechos lovakia may be f'ound on 
pp. 79-96. 
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no one would gain f rom a new war except Soviet Russia, and that he was 
eager for a rapprochement 'With Germany. 36 
Late in May 1938, Chamberlain ' s opinions concerning Czechoslovakia 
were revealed in an article appearing in ~ Montreal ~ . It reported 
the Prime Minister as having said in an interview that: 
IT . the British think there i s little danger of immediate 
war i n Europe ••• the British do not expect to fight for 
Czechosl ovakia and do not anticipate that France or Russia 
will either . That being so, then the Czechs must accede to 
the German demands, if' reasonable ••• Britian would like 
to swing Germany and Italy into a working agreement with 
Britain and France t o keep the peace in Europe . Soviet 
Russia i s excl~j~ on the ground that it does not work well 
in harness ••• 
Direct involvement of the British government in the Czechoslovak-
German dispute over the secessionist demands of the Sudeten German 
majority took place in July 1938, with the dispatch of the Runciman 
mission to Prague . Chamberlain, on July 26, declared to the House of 
Commons that II in response t o a request by the government of Czechoslo-
vakia, we have proposed a person with the necessary experience and 
qualities to investigate on the spot and endeavor to suggest means to 
bring negotiations to success . 1138 Lord Runciman was present at the 
final breakdown of the negotiations between the Cabinet and the Czech 
N'azi party and reported to Chamberlain that "the respons ibility for the 
break must rest upon Henlein and Frank, " the leaders of the German 
minority, but added, "the Czechoslovak rule for twenty years, though 
36a. E. B. Gedyes, Betrayal in Central Europe (New York, 1939), 
p . 365-366. 
37Joan and J onathan .Griff in, Lost Liberty (London, 1939), p . 137. 
3~rederick Schuman, Europe ~ the Eve (New York, 1939), p . 380. 
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not oppressive and 'terrori stic ', has been marked by tactlessness ••• 
petty intolerance and discrimination. 1139 He recommended that the l ast 
compromise proposal of the Prague Government, "Pl:an Four", be supported 
by the British government, but in his final report Lord Runciman concluded 
that, because of the real danger and imminence of an outbreak of warfare 
between Czechs and Germans, the frontier districts should be ceded by 
Czechos lovakia to Germany. 
Meanwhile, Hitler in his speech to the Nuernberg Convention on 
September 13, 1938, resolved to assume charge over the fate of the German 
minority of Czechos lovakia, a decision that prompted the French premier, 
Daladier, to suggest to Chamberlain a meeting with Hitler t o head off an 
international conflict . Following the prime minister' s return from 
Berchtesgaden on September 14, an Anglo-French conference was held in 
London to which President Benes dispatched a message that his government 
would refuse to accept any mediat i on without prior consultation of its 
content . Nevertheless , the British and French leaders informed the Czech 
government that it should cede the front ier areas to Germany . Benes' 
Cabinet voted unanimously to reject the mediation, as it would destroy 
the economic and strategic stability of Czechoslovakia and leave her 
subject to further dismemberment and subjugation by Germany. Besides, 
the European balance of power, which rested upon containment of Germany, 
would be mm.ermined and the security of all Europe would be endangered. 
Instead of heeding Benes' advice, the French and British governments 
admonished Czechoslovakia for imperiling the peace and withdrew their 
diplomatic support from the beleaguered nation on September 20, 1938. 
39Ibid., pp . 387-388. 
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The French note stated that: 11 If the Czechoslovak Government does not 
accept unconditionally the .Anglo-French plan, it will be held solely 
responsible for any war which may ensue, and France vill take no part 
in it. n 40 President Benes immediately convened a joint meeting of the 
Cabinet and representatives of the political parties which, following 
prolonged deliberations and another Anglo-French ultimatum to capitulate, 
decided that isolated resistance against Germany was futile. It there-
fore submitted to the .Anglo-French demand to surrender the frontier 
territories to Germany. 
On September 22, Chamberlain conveyed the Czechos l ovak acceptance 
of the London proposals to Hitler at Godesberg, but even before his 
departure the German press already indicated that "the settlement which 
had been possible a week ago wa.s no longer suitable," and that Germany 
had additional demands which must be met . Hitler demanded fresh con-
cess ions from Chamberlain at the Godesberg encounter, with great arrogance, 
truculence and a display of bad manners . The Godesberg memorandum demanded 
the surrender to Germany of the entire fortified zone of Czechoslovakia, 
a condition which revealed Hitler's plan to leave the country totally 
defenseless . Chamberlain found it impossible to recommend submissi on 
by Czechoslovakia to these conditions, so, seconded by Daladier, he 
advised the Prague Government to mobilize. Within a few days over one 
and one-half million men were mobilized and placed on a war footing with 
precision and dispatch. It was apparent that Hitler was only seeking an 
excuse to attack Czechoslovakia, and that his goal was not that of 
40Hubert Ripka, Munich Before and After (London, 1939), p . 81. 
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satisfying the demands of the Sudeten Germans , but that of total sub-
jugation of Czechoslovakia. The Godesberg memorandum, which even 
Chamberlain branded as unacceptable, was rejected by the Czechoslovak 
government, not only because of the i nordinate demands, but principally 
because they would have left the country defenseless . Benes' government 
inf'ormed the British Prime Minister: "We rely upon the two great Western 
democracies, whose 'Wishes we have followed much against our own judgment, 
to stand by us in our hour of trial" , in a note that was handed to 
41 Chamberlain on September 25. 
The failure of the Godesberg discussions, Chamberlain' s return to 
London, and the Czechoslovakian mobilizati on, impassi oned Hitler to 
deliver a speech in the Berlin Sport Pa.last on September 26, in which 
he described Czechosl ovakia ' s mobilization as a provocation instigated 
by Sovi et Russia, calumni ated President Benes and threatened war unless 
his demands were met . 
Chamberlain, however, had not given up all hope for an accomodation. 
Hi s personal envoy delivered a letter to Hitl er prior to the latter' s 
Berlin speech in which Chamberlain again expressed his belief that "a 
42 settlement by negotiation remains possible . " Hitler replied that he 
was willing to guarantee that independence and territorial integrit y of 
the remainder of Czechoslovakia and requested Chamberlain to bring his 
government to reason at the very last hour . Chamber lain replied that 
Germany "may get all essentials without war and delay11 and proposed a 
Four Power conference, an offer which Hi tler accepted. On September 28, 
41 
Ibid. , p . 163. 
42 
~-, p . 173 . 
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1938, during a debate in the House of Commons, Chamberlain received 
Hitler's invitation :for a Four Power meeting to decide the disposition 
of the "Sudetenland" . 
The Big Four meeting between Chamberlain, Deladier, Hitler and 
Mussolini, opened in f.fu.nich on September 28, 1938. Unknown t o the 
Western leaders , the German General Staff had informed IIitl.er in a 
memorandum. just two days previously that a Germany military defeat must 
be expected in any but a strictly l ocalized con:flict . 43 The Czechoslo-
vakian government was not invited to send any delegation to the conference 
·which was deliberating its fate . The meeting between the Big Four lasted 
six hours , and the agreement which was reached granted to Germany the 
right to annex the Sudetenland in return for a quadripartite guarantee 
to respect the independence and sovereignty of Czechos lovakia . To 
compensate Czechoslovakia :for the economic dislocation which would result 
from the expuls ion of Czechs from the Sudetenland, the British Prime 
Minister unilaterally offered to advance a credit of£ 30,000, 000 . 
The Czechoslovakian government was given two hours in which to accept 
the terms of the agreement or face the prospect of a full-scale German 
military attack. 
43Ibid. , pp . 212-213 . 
CHA.PrER II 
RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA 
The Plight of the Nation 
Outside of Czechos lovakia the Munich agreement was received with 
comforting relief. Chamberlain and Daladier were welcomed by their 
respective Parliaments, 'Which approved their policy of peace by over-
whelming majorities . Chamberlain believed that M..ulich was the prelude 
1 to a larger settlement that would bring lasting peace t o all of Europe . 
Only a few peopl e realized that the Munich Accord bad actually shaken 
the traditional balance of power and increased immensely the preponderance 
of Hitler ' s Germany. A Czechos lovak newspaper drew the following con-
clusions from the ~iunich Pact: 
"What might have been achieved in Pre-Munich days by enlightened 
and vigorous diplomacy was now impossible to regain. As in 
the case of Serbia, 1911~, the question at i ssue was not so 
much the independence of a litt.le cotmtry but who was going 
to dominate Europe. The crippling of Czechos lovakia could 
not avert the clash between the2Reich and the western 
powers, but brought it nearer. 11 
The Czechoslovakian foreign minister received the decision taken at 
Munich--"without us and against us"--from the hands of the English, French, 
and Italian Ambassadors in P-~ague. 
1iz. G. D. La:ffan, Survey of International Afi'airs 1938 (London, 1952 ), 
p . 1~15. Hereinafter referred to as Survey, 1938. 
2E. B. "The Disaster, 11 Lidove Noviny (Brno, October 3, 1938 ), p . l . 
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Shortly a:fterwards, German troops occupied the Sudeten territory, 
which was immediately annexed to the Reich. The Polish and Hungarian 
demands for Czechoslovakian territory were to be accomodated by means of 
bilateral negotiations which, if not met within three months, were to be 
resolved by another meeting of the four powers . The Poles made no effort 
to negotiate their claims with the Czechoslovak government, but simply 
issued an ultimatum to the government of their uni'ortunate neighbor and 
annexed the Teschen region. Czechoslovakian territories in Slovakia and 
Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia were then awarded to Hungary by decision of the 
Germ.an and Italian foreign ministers meeting in Vienna . This act was in 
violation of the Munich agreement, for, instead of four signatories, 
only two decided the matter; but the British and French quietly and 
supinely acquiesced. 
President Benes realized that his position as President was untenable 
now that Hitler sought to reduce his country to the status of a protecto-
rate . Upon receiving Hitler's demand to resign and leave Czechoslovakia 
from his ambassador in Berlin, Benes submitted his resignation and de-
parted for London. 3 Czechoslovakia was at the mercy of Hitler, whose 
price for the country's continued truncated existence was to re-orient 
her foreign policy in line with German requirements . The promised 
guarantees of security made at Munich were repudiated within months by 
the Germans, who dismantled the helpless nation into fragments . 
Combined pressures of the Slovak autonomists and the Nazis forced 
the Czechoslovakian government to grant Slovakia and Sub-Carpathian 
Ruthenia autonomous status late in 1938, which enabled the Catholic 
3Edward Benes, Memoirs (London, 1954), p . 50 . 
25 
Party of National Unity to inaugurate an authoritarian regime without 
majority backing among the electorate . 4 The ideology of the Monsignor 
Tiso regime stressed "one God, one Nation, one Leader . " On February, 
1939, the Slovak Vice-Premier addressed Ilitler a s 11Mein Fuehrer" and 
told him: "I entrust the fate of my people to your hands . u5 
In Prague a new central government was formed by a Naziphile Agra-
rian party leader, and the democratic constitution of the Republic was 
replaced by an authoritarian legal order s imilar to the Nazi system. 
Existing political parties were dissolved and replaced by the Party of 
National Unity, comprising Naziphile .Agrarians , Clericals and Small 
Traders, and by the Party of Labour, comprising collaborationist Socialists . 
The Communist Party was outlawed and political activity outside the 
6 recognized parties was prohibited. Elections were abolished and news-
papers were either suppressed or regimented by censorship, and oppos ition 
against the regime was made a crime . 
The economic plight of what remained of Czechoslovakia was equally 
tragic, for a horde of refugees had to be re-settled as a result of the 
mass expulsion of Czechs from the German- occupied territories . Employ-
ment was provided for these people by impress ing many i nto compulsory 
labor battalions, by removing married women from the public services, 
and by retiring other public employees . The public payroll was over-
burdened at a time when revenues had dropped by forty per cent and taxable 
4Hubert Ripka, Munich Before ~ After (London, 1939), p . 256 . 
5s . Harrison Thompson, Czechos lovakia ~ European History (Princeton, 
1953), p . 403 . 
6 
Survey, 1938, p . 605. 
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income by over thirty-five per cent . The economic disequilibrium could 
not be resolved without external l oans , yet although the British and 
French government s had offered to provide loans and trade credits at 
Munich, the extent of western aid amounted to "a reduction of Czechoslo-
vakian export quotas to France by half' and the six million pounds 
British loan . u7 
The most damaging effect of the Mu..llich agreement was upon the morale 
of the Czechos lovak people, whose spirit of resistance against Hitler and 
of solidarity with Britain and France had been stirred following Hitler' s 
Godesberg ultimatum. Mobilization had been effected in record time amid 
a resounding display of national unity and patriotism. The surrender by 
England and France to Germany' s demands and the order to demobilize spread 
bitter disillusionment throughout Czechoslovakia . There was such a sense 
of frustration, disgrace and dishonor at having to surrender without a 
display of courage in battle among the mobilized citizen army that military 
discipline was severely shaken. The feeling of betrayed trust towards 
France and Britain shattered the hopes and ideals of the Czech nation and 
its trust in the West . "We are crying because of the behavior of the 
France we loved, " wrote a Czech political leader to the French general, 
Faucher, the head of the French military mission in Prague . 8 
Anguished curses and i nsults were hurled against the western democra-
cies by the citizens of the betrayed nation as the feeling of hatred for 
Hitler was surpassed by resentment and animosity against the former allies . 
In this state of anomie and cynicism, some Czechs gave vent to anti-Semiti sm 
7cato, "The International Loans," Pritomnost (Prague, February 15, 
1939), p . 74 . 
8 Hubert Ripka, Munich Before ~ Af'ter (London, 1939), p. 159. 
while others heaped abuse upon the exiled President Benes for his 
"catastrophic poli cy of cooperation with the Western democracies . " 
The native fascists, however, failed to win any positive response 
among the people, and even the government took measures against their 
excesses and tried to preserve at least some of the past traditions of 
democracy and humanitarianism. 9 
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The government had great difficulty in maintainir · any confidence or 
consensus in its policies, for the people suspected it of being a tool 
of the Nazis and distrusted its motives and its spokesmen. It was not 
understood or appreciated that the many cruel and brutal decrees which 
purged the bureaucracy, army and press of Benes' supporters , and applied 
Hitler's racial laws against the Jews, as well as other distasteful 
measures against the Legionnaires and Sokols, were the result of direct 
orders from Berlin. 
No amount of subservience by the Czechoslovakian Government to 
Berlin was able to sat i sfy Hitler, however, s o preparations were made 
by the Nazis to establish direct German rule over the country. Sudeten 
Germans, now citizens of the Reich, had to be a llowed to continue their 
studies at the German university in Prague, which became a hot-bed of 
Nazism. Extraordinary demands were made for privileges by these and other 
German groups which remained with Czechoslovakia, as a pretext for Hitler 
to destroy the remnant of what remained of the once iudependent republic; . 10 
On March 14, 1939, llllder the pretext that the German minority had 
been attacked, the President of Czechoslovakia was summoned by Hitler to 
9~ ., p . 252 . 
10R. w. Seton-Watson, From Munich to Danzig (London, 1939), p . 376-378. 
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s ign away "the destiny of the Czech people and of their lands" to the 
Fuehrer, who threatened to unleash the German army and air force against 
the hapless nation if the demand were refused. 11 On the same day the 
Slovak Diet, under orders from Hitler, proclaimed Slovakia's separation 
and independence from Czechos l ovak. A few day's later the Slovaks were 
forced to grant Germany the right to establish military bases in Slovakia 
on the southern borders of Poland, and to secure Germa.n approval of all 
foreign corrnnitments, which made Slovakia a protectorate of the Reich. 
This was followed by the entrance of the German Army into Prague, and 
the establishment of the additional protectorates of Bohemia and Moravia 
in place of the Republic of Czechoslovakia, whose existence as an inde-
pendent state was thus temporarily ended. 
Western reaction against Hitler's total subjugation of Czechoslovakia 
only six months after Munich's solemn engagements to respect the new 
status~ was sharp and critical. Chamberlain ' s first statement , that 
he had "no wish to be associated with any indictment that Hitler was 
guilty of a breach of faith", produced such a revolt in the Conservative 
party that two days later, in a speech delivered at Birmingham, he was 
12 
111.msparing in vigorous protest" against the Nazi attack. In the House 
of Lords , Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax remonstrated that: 
"the position i s entirely changed when we are confronted with 
the arbitrary suppression of an independent sovereign state 
by armed force and by the violation of what I must regard as 
the elementary rules of international conduct. It is natural 
enough that in the light of these events the Government 1~ould 
be told that the policy of' Munich was a tragic mistake . " 
11Ibid. 
12 Kenneth Ingram, Years of Cris i s (New York, 1947), p . 185. 
l3Hubert Ripka, Munich Before and After (London, 1939), p . 398. 
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Daladier explained to the French Senate t r...at the Muni ch Agreement 
and the policy of' Franco-German cooperati on were no l onger b i ndi ng as a 
result of Germany' s f l agrant violation of Czechos l ovakia' s independence 
and soverei gnty, "i n spite of the most solemn commitments . 11 14 
Soviet Rus sia branded Germany's action a s arbitrary, viol ent and 
aggress i ve, and indicated that France and England would be menaced in 
their own security now that the ring of alliance around Germany no 
longer existed. 15 
The United States also condemned Germany for acts "which have result -
ed in the temporary extinguishment of a free and i ndependent people with 
whom, f rom the day when the Republic of Czechos lovaki a attained its 
independence , the peopl e of the United States have maintained especi ally 
16 close and fr i endly relations ••• " 
To President Benes, at that time i n the United States, Germany' s 
subjugati on of Czechoslovakia and Western and Soviet condemnation of i t , 
now offered the opportunity t o organize a new national liberation govern-
ment in exil e . Ile immediately sent telegrams to the heads of the govern-
ments of France, Great Britain, the United States , the Soviet Union and 
to the League of Nations, urging them to refuse to recognize the "great 
international crime, and to assume the consequences which today' s tragi c 
s ituation in Europe and i n the world urgently requires " . l7 
14 
Ibid., p . 399-400. 
l5Samuel H. Cuff, ~ ~ 2!_ the~ (New York, 1942) , pp. 61-62 . 
16Toid. 
17Edva.rd Benes, Memoirs , p. 65. 
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Dr . Benes' plan of action was to transform the widespread sympathy 
for Czechoslovakia into recognition by the western powers and the Soviet 
Union of the government - in-exile which he was about to establish, and to 
enlist Western aid in organizing a Czechos lovakian liberation army. 
Western refusal to recognize the illegal Germ.an occupation of Czecho-
slovakia permitted the Western governments to establish diplomatic rela-
tions with Benes ' projected government-in-exile, a.nd to assist it economi-
cally and militarily. From the standpoint of international law, 
Czechoslovakia could exist de j1.U"e in relation to the Western powers, so 
long as they did not recognize the validity of the de facto condition 
of debellatio, which had been in.flicted illegally by Germany. The heads 
of the Czechoslovak diplomatic and consular missions in the western 
countries refused to surrender their properties to the German diplomati c 
agents, and they were allowed to exercise their diplomatic and consular 
rights and privileges, and to perform such functions as the issuance of 
passports and visas, and the protection of Czechosl ovak nationals and 
their interests . Such action was no i nfringement of Germany's legal 
rights, s i nce the extinction of Czechos l ovakia vrac in violation of 
objective international law. Official Western recognition of the Czech 
government - in-exile was not accorded for more than a year after the 
sei zure of the country by Hitler . During this period Czechos lovakia 
existed in a legal vacuum in relation to the Western powers, for the 
Republic had no recognized government to represent it internationally. 
Benes and other Czechoslovaks who joined him in exile formed a Czecho-
s l ovak National Committee, with branches in Paris and London, in the 
spring of 1939. The Committee was not accorded any degree of legal 
recognition, however, until October, 1939, when the French and British 
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Governi~ents authorized it to recruit and staff a number of military units 
in France and England for service with the Allied forces. Czechos lovakian 
refugees who escaped to the West were enlisted into this Czechoslovak 
Brigade, which fought on the western front and was evacuated at Dunkirk 
to England with the British and a few French forces . Up to the conclu-
sion of the Russo-Germari pact of August , 1939, Czechoslovak Communists 
had taken part in the patriotic movement against the Germans at home and 
ri...ad cooperated with the Czechoslovak National Committee abroad . There-
after they sabotaged the domestic resistence movement, launched a campaign 
against Dr. Benes and the National Committee, which they accused of being 
a tool of Franco-British imperialism, and a great number of them deserted 
the newly organized Czechoslovak voluntary brigade. The Soviet government 
ceased to give refuge to Czechoslovak refugees, interned those who were 
in Soviet territory, recognized the fascist Slovak State, and terminated 
the diplomatic status of the Czechoslovak ambassador in Moscow. Not until 
the German invas ion of Russia were diplomatic relations re-established 
between the USSR and the Czechoslovak government-in-exile, after which 
the Czechoslovak Communists resumed the policy of patriotic unity in 
cooperation with the National Committee . 18 
Dr. Benes made another attempt to secure diplomatic recognition of 
t he Czechoslovak National Committee as the de facto government of the 
Republic, following the Dunkirk evacuation and the collapse of France in 
June 1940. He sought from the British government recognition of the 
legal continuity of Czechoslovakia and of his committee as the legitimate 
successor to the sovereignty of the state in its international relations . 19 
18 ) Josef Josten, Oh,~ Country (Chicago, 1950 , pp . 22-27 . 
l9Edward Benes, Memoirs , p . 106 . 
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The evacuation to British soil of the Czechoslovak brigade, its allegiance 
to the National Committee, and its eagerness t o fight the Germans , con-
tributed to British recognition of Benes as the responsible head of the 
provisional government of Czechoslovakia on July 21, 1940, with full 
capacity to negotiate international agreements and conduct diplomatic 
relations for the Republic, dispose of Czechoslovak properties and assets 
in the British Empire, and borrow money on the credit of the Republic . 
~ Jure recognition of the Benes government was granted by the British 
in July, 1941, after the Soviet Ambassador in London had re-established 
diplomatic relations with the Czechoslovak government-in-exile . 20 The 
United States extended its recognition immediately afterwards, so that 
restoration of the status quo ante Munich awaited only the military 
defeat of Nazi Germany. 
The Benes government turned its attention next to the formal a.bro-
gation by England and France of the Munich agreement, so that Czechos lo-
vakia could re-assert a legal right to her pre -Munich boundaries upon 
the expulsion of the German occupation forces . The United States, under 
the Stimson Doctrine, had never recognized the alienation of Czechoslo-
vakian territory made under duress in 1938, so its support of Czechoslo-
vakia' s claim to the restoration of her pre-Munich frontiers wa.s assured. 
The Russians agreed to recognize the Czechoslovak boundary claims in the 
exchange of diplomatic notes by which they recognized the Benes government . 
In 1942 the Churchill government finall y agreed to formally denounce the 
Munich agreement after repeated insistence by Benes , an act which General 
De Gaulle performed in the name of the Free French Committee. 21 
21Ib.d -2:,_., p . 232 . 
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President Benes' Trip to Moscow 
Diplomatic recognition and f'ormal annulment of the Munich Agreement 
provided strong international support for the restoration of an indepen-
dent, soverei gn and democratic Republic in Czechoslovakia . Benes, how-
ever, wished to lay the foundation for a more viable nation, so thnt his 
country's future security would not be menaced again by the irredentist 
claims of neighboring states . His solution was to secure diploma.tic 
support from the allies for the expulsion of the pro-Nazi elements of 
the German and Hungarian minorities, upon the re-establishment of his 
government i n the territory of Czechoslovakia. This request was granted 
by the allied powers . 22 
Another objective of the Benes government-in-exile during the course 
of the war against the Axis was to re-establish friendly relations with 
the Polish government -in-exile, with which there had been frict i on from 
the period of the }fu.nich crisis arising from the Polish annexation of 
the Teschen district of Czechoslovakia . The absence of an alliance 
between the two countries had weakened each and had facilitated German 
expansionist policy. It appeared to Benes that the national security 
of Czechoslovakia would be strengthened by the conclusion of a political 
and military alliance or confederation with Poland. Churchill gave 
the plan his blessing, because he foresaw the necessity o:r re-building 
a balance of power on the continent as the basis for British security 
and peace. A Slavonic confederation would serve to contain the penetra-
tion of Russian power and influence into central Europe, and also act as 
22 s . Harrison Thompson, Czechoslovakia in European History (Princeton, 
1953), p . 427. 
a counterweight to the Soviet colossus--such was the opinion of the 
23 British leader. 
The projected union with Poland did not materialize f'or a number of 
reasons . Neither government would compromise on the disposition of the 
Teschen district, which both claimed. But the main reason was that while 
the Polish-Czechoslovak Confederation presupposed "a connnon foreign 
24 policy", Polish relations with the Soviet Union were hostile, due to 
the Russian annexation of eastern Poland in 1939, and repeated cl aims to 
the region, while the Czechoslovakians regarded Russia their natural ally, 
and were on good terms with the Soviet regime . A connnon policy towards 
the Soviet was impossible for Czechs and Poles to agree upon, a s Benes 
insisted that an alliance with the Soviet Union must f'orm the keystone of 
the future conm1on foreign policy. Soviet opposition to the scheme doomed 
its prospects completely, and the Moscow and Teheran conferences placed 
the Western stamp of approval to the Soviet objection. 25 
The friendly attitude of President Benes towards the Soviet Union 
stemmed from his interpretation of Czechoslovakia' s security requirements . 
As the architect of Czechoslovak foreign policy, Benes had devoted his 
lifetime to the solution of the problem of national security. In the 
power vacuum of post-Versailles Europe, he had realized that, if Czecho-
slovakia was to survive, she would need to supplement her national :power 
and the collective security guarantees of the League of Nations by a series 
of alliances with France, Yugoslavia, Rumania and the Soviet Union. He 
had always deemed the absence of Soviet participation i n the def'ense of 
23survey, 1941-194'6, pp . 322-323 . 
24 Art . 2 of Czechoslovak-Polish Protocol of January 19, 1942 . 
25survey, 1941-1946, pp. 322-323. 
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the status quo as an impa irement of the balance of power . Without a 
Russian alliance there would be no assurance agai nst the repetition of 
the German "Drang nach Osten" . These were the reasons why, despite his 
opposi tion to Communi sm, Benes had actively promoted Soviet membership 
in the League of Nations, and had concluded the mutual assistance treaty 
\-Tith Litvinov. 26 
President Benes foresaw the dis -integration of German power in 1942 
after the landing of American and British troops in north Africa and the 
i u'Ipress ive Russian victory at Stalingrad. The Casablanca Con:ference of 
January, 1943, which offered the Axis peace only upon unconditional 
surrender, led Benes to conclude that the end o:r the war would result in 
a power vacuum in Central Europe which would be filled by the three 
Great Powers . To insure Czechoslovak security by means of a British or 
an P.1nerican alliance seemed unrealistic, since the Anglo-Americans had 
no tradition for making l ong-term political and military commitments . 
The only power that might assume a commitment to def'end Czechos lovakia 
against a future German threat appeared to be Soviet Russia, who was 
destined to emerge from the war as the greatest power in Europe, and 
would have an equal national interest in containing Ge!'IJ'l.any. The apparent 
fact that Czechoslovakia and Russia would be immediate neighbors di d not 
alarm Benes unduly, as he was confident that he could reach a modus 
vivendi with Moscow to respect Czechoslovakia ' s institutions and terri-
torial integrity,J and desist from assisting the Czechos lovak Communists , 
who were bent upon Soviet annexation of' Slovakia and establishL"lg a 
Communi st-dominated government in Prague . 27 
26 Eduard Taborsky, ttBenes and the Soviets, 11 Foreign Affairs, XXVI I 
(1949)' p . 302 . 
27Hubert Ripka, Czechoslovakia Enslaved (London, 1950), pp . 22-23 . 
Since the days of the Munich conference, Benes had respected the 
Soviet Union for its offer to support Czechoslovakia to resist Hi tler ' s 
demands, even a.f'ter Britain and France had broken their pledges . I n 
1942 Benes wrote: "I was extremely grateful to the Soviet Union, for it 
was the only one who supported us and oi'fered assistance beyond i ts 
obligation. 1128 
The contrast between the resolute di plomacy of the Russians, who 
extended full recognition to Benes ' regime-in-exil e and agreed to the 
restorat i on of the pre-war borders of Czechoslovakia shortly after they 
were attacked by Germany, and the procrastination of the Bri t i sh in 
maki ng any conmdtments to Benes, nllienated the trust of the Czechosl ovak 
leader in the reliability of Bri t i sh i ntentions respecting Centr a l Europe . 29 
Finally President Benes believed that the Soviet Union would develop 
into a form of social democracy, whi ch encouraged him in his effort to 
believe in the sincerity of Soviet intentions , despite the lingering 
distrust ,nlich disturbed hi s mind . He al so fe l t that the United States , 
Great Britain, and the Soviet Uni on vould maintai n thei r concert of power 
and collaborate in the establishinent and maintai nance of a vi ab l e peace 
in Europe . 30 
Benes ' j ourney t o Moscow was gi ven advance encouragement by President 
Roosevelt, but met with British objections, s ince Foreign Secretary Eden 
was of the opini on that "i t would i mpair the settlem nt of the Polish-
Soviet dispute. tt The real reason, hm-rever, ·was tbat Great Britain and 
28 Edward Benes, The Days of Munich {London, 1955) , p . 88 . 
29Ferdinand Peroutka., Was Dr. Benes Guilty (Paris , 1949) , p . 14. 
30Ibid., p . 13 . 
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the Soviet Union had a treaty obligation not to conclude any bilateral 
pacts with other European governments during the war . After the British 
agreed to waive this provision in October 1943, approval of the Benes 
mission to Moscow was granted by Whitehall . 3l 
At the end of November 1943, President Benes left London for Moscow 
to conclude his projected treaty with the Soviet Union and to discuss 
matters relating to post-"War cooperation. By chance, Benes reached Moscow 
shortly after the Teheran Conference, where his prospective treaty with 
the Soviet Union had been discussed and recollll!lended by the Big Three . 
The carefully prepared and magnificent welcome which he received in 
Moscow impressed Benes, where, in contrast to his last visit in 1935, he 
noticed the tremendous progress which the Soviet Union had made . His 
discussions ,n.th Stalin, Molotov and other Russian representatives were 
cordial and he had no difficulty in securing Soviet consent to his requests . 
Stalin and Molotov promised to restrain from interfering in the internal 
affairs of Czechoslovakia and denied any intention to use the Czechoslovak 
Communist group in Moscow for purposes of subverting Czechoslovakia in 
the future . The Rus s ians agreed to allow Czechoslovak military units 
attached to the Red army t o enter Czechoslovakia simultaneously with the 
Soviet forces, and to transfer civil administrative powers immediately to 
the Benes government throughout the liberated areas , including Ruthenia , 
to which the Soviet Union laid no clai.m!J . 32 
Benes and Stalin discussed the projected Czechoslovak-Polish confedera -
ti.on, to which the Soviet leader made no objection. Stalin assured Benes 
3~duward Taborsky, "Benes' Trips to Moscow,' Svedectvi, I (1957), 
p . 171. 
32~ . , p . 198. 
that he had no personal objection to the Polish premier, Mikolajczyk . 
The Czech President sought t o restore mutual confidence and cooperation 
between Poland and Russia because he "wanted to secure a Soviet -Polish 
alliance in order t o ensure that the stormy past of Ea.stern Europe would 
be stablized in the future, and because his effort to bring it about 
would increase Czech prestige in the eyes of Moscow, London, and Washing-
ton. n33 
Benes even met with the Czechoslovak Communists who were residing 
in Moscow in order to lay the basis for cooperation with them in a 
coali tion government, for he was aware that post -war political loyalties 
would be extremely radical, and that the Communists could not be safely 
excluded from the government . The Communists demanded that the Coalition 
cabinet be formed in advance of the liberation of the homeland, and that 
a Marxian Socialist be appointed Premier. They also ins i sted that the 
task of civil administration in the liberated areas of Czechoslovakia 
should be assigned to l ocally constituted committees of national libera-
tion instead of to centrally appointed officials . 
The Czechosl ovak-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Assistance and 
Post-war Cooperation was concl uded and s i gned on December 12, 1943, and 
became effective immediately. It provided for mutual assistance in the 
current war against Germany and in any future war against the same enemy. 
The two signatories promised t o expand their economic relationship and 
to adhere to "mutual respect f or each other ' s independence and soverei gnty, 
and to non-interference in the internal affairs of the other. "34 
33Edward K. Rozek, Allied Wartime Diplomacy (London, 1957), p . 171. 
34Art . 4. 
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Benes was confident upon his return to London at the end of 1943 
that he had re- established the premises for the external security and 
internal stability of his country. Ile considered his journey to Moscow 
as the culmination of nearly thirty years of ceaseless effort by himself 
and Thomas Masaryk to establish "harmonious cooperation among the :free, 
independent and democratic Slavic States . "35 
Benes ' Return t o Czechoslovakia 
President Benes' optimism over the prospects of friendship with 
the Soviet Union and cooperation with the Czechoslovak Communist s was 
shaken late in the summer of 1944 by the vis i t to Moscow of a delegation 
representing General Catlos of the fascist Slovak Army. The Slov::i,k 
military leader ·was prepared to place his forces under the general 
comma.nd of the Red Army 'When the latter's units reached Slovakia, and 
to administer the territory on behalf of the Soviet occupation forces . 
Benes protested to the Soviet ambassador against this violation of the 
recent Czechoslovak-Soviet Treaty, and was assured by the envoy that the 
discussions were conducted by party officials and not by government 
officials . Subsequently the Slovak underground resistance groups who 
were engaged in guerrilla combat against the Germans , and who were in 
desperate need of Red Army assistance, were exposed to the f ull brunt of 
German fury and reprisals by the sudden halt of the Soviet advance, for 
which there was no satisfactory explan.ation. 36 
35Edward Benes, Memoirs, p . 239. 
36Edward Taborsky, "Benes ' Trips to Moscow, " Svedectvi, I (1957), 
p . 203 . 
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The Red Array resumed its advance during the fall of 1944 and crossed 
into Ruthenia, the eastern-most region of Czechoslovakia. Pursuant t o 
the provisions of the Czechoslovak-Soviet Treaty of May 8, 1944, that all 
Czechos lovak territories which were occupied by the Red Army would be 
immediately turned over the Czechoslovak administrators, a Czechoslovak 
delegation was sent to Ruthenia from London to take charge of the l ocal 
civil administration. The Red Army command refused to support the London 
Czechoslovaks and allowed the local Communists partisans instead to 
assume direction of the local administration. 37 The Communist partisans 
went so far as to seize the funds which the London delegation had brought, 
and to petition Stalin in the name of the localities ,mich they were 
administering that the Soviet government annex Ruthenia . The l ocal popu-
lation was subjected to military conscription by the Red Army instead of 
being allowed to form units of the Czechoslovak national army. 
When Benes sent a diplomatic protest to Stalin over the interference 
by the local Communists and the connivance of the Red Army with them in 
preventing the re-establishment of Czechoslovak authority in' Ruthenia, 
Stalin replied that the Red Army was not permitted to interfere in internal 
political rivalries between the various Czechoslovak parties, or repress 
the people from expressing their wishes . He added that since the local 
inhabitants had raised the question of the admission of Ruthenia to the 
Soviet Ukraine, the Soviet Union felt obliged to protect the interests of 
the l ocal residents and had a right to ins ist upon negotiation of this 
internai question. 38 This Soviet interference in the internal matters of 
37 J. W. Bruegel, ~ ~ of Ruthenia (London, 1954), p . 31. 
38Josef J osten, Oh,~ Country (Chicago, 1950), p . 34. 
Czechoslovakia. was a painf'ul reminder of the Nazi subversi on of the 
Republic, by which an active minority had invoked the intervention of 
a fore ign power to dismember its territory. Cessi on of thi s territory 
would give the Red Arrrry control of important passes through the Carpathians 
and a common frontier with Hungary, which would help to increase Soviet 
i nfl uence and control over all of Eastern Europe . 
When Benes turned to his British and American allies with a request 
that Western forces carry out the military occupation of Czechos l ovakia, 
he was informed that the task of liberating his country had been assigned 
to the Red Ar:rey, which ·was tantamount to placing Czechos lovakia under the 
Soviet sphere of interest and giving discretionary authority t o the 
Russian occupation authorities over internal political matters . 39 Benes 
realized that the independence and sovereignty of his nation depended 
entirely upon cultivating good relations ,n.th Moscow. Therefore, Benes 
decided to settle affairs with the Soviets as quickly as possible directly 
i n Moscow, and then proceed in the wake of the Red Army into Czechoslovakia . 
In bidding farewell to Prime Minister Churchill, Benes indicated his 
concern over Soviet intentions and his determination to protect his 
country's interests . 
Benes arrived in Moscow on March 17, 1945 , and was received with 
great ostentation. However, Stalin, this time, did not take part in the 
political discussions, but limited himself to words of praise for Pan-
Slavism, which he defined as the alliance of all the Slavic nations in 
defense of their individuality, their institutions and their sovereignty. 
Stalin declared to Benes on that occasion: "I know that there are some 
39Edward Taborsky, "Benes ' Trips t o Moscow, ff ~ctvi., I (1957), 
p . 2o4 . 
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who do not believe it, perhaps even you have these doubts , but I assure 
you that we will never i nterfere in the internal affairs of our allies . 1140 
The quest.ion of Ruthenia was l eft for settlement between Mol otov and 
Benes, with the latter agreeing to the Soviet foreign minister's request 
that the Czechoslovak Parliament be urged by the President to voluntarily 
cede the territory t o the Soviet Union. 
President Benes' main concern in Moscow was to reach some agreement 
with the Czechoslovak Communists on the formation of a new goverrunent 
for the liberated country. He planned to include i n the provisional 
cabinet representatives of the anti-fasc i st parties from the internal 
resistance movement and from the London exile regime . Within six months 
ai'ter internal order was re-established, he planned to hold parli amentary 
elections . Since the politi cal support of the Soviet Union was necessary 
because of the liberating role o~ the Red Army, Benes was forced t o deal 
with the Czechoslovak Communist l eaders in Mos cow a.nd t o accept their 
demands to be i ncludecl il: f:;-£ provisional cabinet and to administer 
eight key ministries . The governmental program of the coalition had to 
be agreed upon also, and the Cormnunists were able to insert into it many 
of their concepts . During these inter-party negotiations both Benes and 
the Social Democrat Fierlinger were under pressure to reach a. compromise 
at all cost with t he Communists , who might otherwi se be tempted to sei ze 
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total pmrer i n Czechoslovakia with the backing of' the Red Army. On 
April 5, 1945, President Benes , Premier Fierlinger and the new cabinet 
took up residence on Czechos l ovaki an t erritory in the city of Kosice, 
40 J oroslav Stransky, The Causes and Tasks of' Exile (London, 1950), 
p . 14. 
41Ibid. 
located in eastern Slovakia, and were formally installed as the provi-
sional government of the country. 
Meanwhile, desperate German resistance had slowed the advance of 
the Soviet forces, while the American Fifth Army, cormnanded by General 
Patton, was occupying Bohemia and had reached the outskirts of Prague . 
The resistance movement in the capital ordered a mass upris ing to expel 
the Germans forces to symbolize the nation I s contribution to the war 
against Nazi Germnny. The poorly equipped citizens of Prague were not 
prepared to dislodge the Germans without military assistance from the 
American Army, whose presence was eA"I)ected imminently. Instead of 
pressing his forces into Prague at this critical moment , General Patton 
vras instructed to withdraw his forces behind a line fifty miles west of 
Prague, in order to comply with a political agreement reached at the 
Teheran Conference by the Big Three t o :cecognize Russian primacy in 
Czechoslovakia, and a military agreement between the American Supreme 
Command and the Soviet General Staff which had demarcated the line of 
maximum advance . The liberation of Prague was planned by the Soviets 
to be a Red Army achievement in order to reap the symbolic propaganda 
42 
value of the event . 
40 
'-Dana Adam Sc1unidt, Anato.nv of ~ Satellite (Boston, 1952), p . 79. 
CHAPI'ER III 
BACKGROlnID OF THE COMMUIUST COUP D' N.rAT 
The Key Positions 
The program ·which the coalition government· adopted at Kos ice at 
Conmrunist insis tence was designed by the Czechoslovak Communist party 
to give it complete control over the country by undermining the socio-
economic and political power of the non-Communist parties . The program 
was devised in terms that would appeal to the disoriented, insecure and 
morally anguished nation. The Communists exploited the psychological 
state of mind of the people and made skillful use of propaganda t o 
identi:fy themselves with the success and achievements of the Red Army. 
While under the heel of the German occupation, the Czechoslovaks found 
hope largely in following the military victories of the Red Army. Every 
Soviet advance brought liberation closer . The Red Army gained ever 
increasing prestige among the Czechoslovaks as it inflicted defeat 
after defeat on the German armies . From the time of defeat of the 
Wehrmacht at Stalingrad in 1942, the Czechoslovaks looked to the Soviets 
for their liberation. When the Soviet Troops entered Prague, they 
were greeted with great joy and enthusiasm as liberators by the populace. 
The failure of' the American forces to liberate Prague served to con-
firm the widespread conviction that Czechoslovakia had been placed 
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within the Soviet sphere of power and inf'luence by the Big Three 
1 leaders . 
The Communists exploited the sentiment of pan-Slavic solidarity 
to build up internal prestige f or themselves as the votaries of a pan-
Slavic alliance led by the Soviet Union. The tragic experience of 
the Munich betrayal by the Western democracies undermined the prestige 
of the democratic parties , as they were identified ideologically with 
the West . Their violent hatred of the Germans and their sense of utter 
dependence upon Rus sian power, coupled with their lack of trust in the 
Western powers, convinced the majority of Czechoslovaks during the 
liberation period that their ethnic survival hinged upon the establish-
ment of durable ties of trust with the Soviet Union . 'I'he Czechos l ovak 
Communist party reaped great prestige from the eulogized conception of 
Soviet Russia as the liberator and protector of the Republic, s ince it 
2 could c laim ideological affinities with the Russian leaders . 
The coalition cabinet which the Communist s induced Pres ident Benes 
to accept in Moscow, and which was proclaimed as the provisional govern-
ment in the city of Kosice, consisted of the so-called National Front 
of Anti-Fascist Parties . The leaders of the resistance groups within 
the country were not given separate representation out s ide the six 
recognized political parties, each of ·which was allotted three minis -
terial pos itions in the cabinet . The Communi st s demanded and received 
separate recognition for their Czech and Sl ovak organizations, 'While 
none of the other parties were accorded double representation. Of the 
1 Ivo Duchacek, "The Strategy of Communist Inf'iltration, " World 
Politics , II (1950), p . 345. 
2 
Ibid. , p . 347. 
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six non-party portfolios that were reserved for technicians, the Commu-
nists were able to claim two for their nominees . From the outset, the 
Communists controlled one-third of the Cabinet posts directly, and were 
able to utilize the inf'luence and support of the Prime Minister, Zdenek 
Fierlinger, who was a fellow-travelling Social Democrat . 
The foreign policy of the National Front government -was dedicated 
to the pursuit of common aims with the Soviet Union within the terms 
of the Czechoslovak-Soviet treaty of alliance. Its program was pledged 
"to carry out vigorously a pan-Slavic policy in Eastern Europe . 11 3 The 
internal program of the coalition ,,:-ao pledged to devolve complete auto-
nomy to Slovakia, which would be governed by a separate legislative body 
to be kno,m a s the Slovak National Council, and a responsible executive, 
to be knmm as the Council of Commissioners . In perpetuating Slovak 
individuality, the Comnrunists hoped to win popular support in Slovakia, 
by flattering local nationalism, and to turn the Slovaks against the 
Czechs , 11 i f the latter were not disposed t o accept domination by the 
,,4 
extreme left . The sizeable German and Magyar minorities were to be 
expelled from the country unless they could individually prove that 
they had participated in the resistance movement . Special People' s 
Courts were to be established to judge and punish collaborators and war 
criminals . The properties of' those who were convicted and punished 
were to be conf'iscated a s an additional punitive sancti on. 
This provision for forced conf'i scation set the example for whole-
sale nationalization of land, industry, insurance, and banking. The 
National Front program promised economic democracy through a social 
3Hubert Ripka, Czechoslovakia Ens laved (London, 1950), p . 28. 
4Ibid. 
welfare policy and self-governing workers' councils i n industry, and 
pr ovided guarantees of political freedom. It also advocated the simpli-
f ication of the former political party system, the unif'ication of the 
trade unions and other institutions, and the establishment of Nat i onal 
(People' s ) Committees as local organs of public admini stration . 
Not only did the National Front program of action contain goal s 
towards which the Corm:minjsts were striving in order to win popular 
consensus , but even more significantly, the key positions in the cabinet 
aud bureaucracy became party instruments of the Communists . The Ministry 
of Information which was established in 1945, became a key instrument of 
the Commun.1st party in its effort t o mobilize public zeal and channel it 
into revolutionary action. The ministry provided employment for thou-
sands of intellectual s of Comnru.nist persuasion and f i nanced the party's 
propaganda. During the postwar period of economic dislocation, control 
of the ini'ormati on services constituted a near monopoly of the organs of 
public opinion. 5 The Communist party directed the Ministry of Education 
and the teachers towards the objective of i mpart ing a "people's culture" 
to the pupils, which meant indoctrinat i on in Marxi sm and preparation for 
revolutionary action. Control of the Ministry of Soci a l Welfare gave 
the Co:nmn.mists vast funds to distribute among the "victims of: Nazi 
persecution. " Persons who wanted compensation f r om the St ate for suffer-
ing and losses at the hands of the Nazi s had to qualify in the eyes of 
the Conmrunist employees of the l>fi.nistry, which came to mean serving the 
Communi st Party. 
5vratislav Busek, !:._ Lesson of ~ February Coup 2:_'~ (New York, 
1954), p . 49-50. 
48 
The Ministries of Agricultu.re and Interior were perhaps the most 
6 important vehicles of Communist ascension t o power in Czechoslovakia. 
The former was placed in charge of land confiscations in connection with 
the dispossession of German and Magyar inhabitants, and also in control 
of the division of large holdings and re-distribution of farms to tenants 
and laborers. In the border areas alone, 110 ,000 Czechoslovak families 
were re-settled and 80, 000 administrative posts were created to assume 
custody over the urban properties that were vacated by the expelles . 
Permanent titles of ownership were not immediately granted, and the 
of'ficials of the Ministry let it be understood that evictions might result 
in the event of an electoral defeat by the Communist party. 7 
Major attention was concentrated upon the Interior Ministry by the 
Connmmists , who insisted that they should direct the national police 
agencies and forces, and the numerous administrative organs which handled 
the investigation and the formulat ion of criminal charges , or the granting 
of immunity, pardon or parole in matters of political collaboration with 
the Nazis . A presidential decree of 1945 had unwittingly established the 
jurisdiction of special People's Courts for cases of collaborationism, 
and vested the powers of police investigation and formulation of criminal 
charges with the Interior Ministry' s police. The local police officials 
and the non-professional judges of the People' s Courts, who were appointed 
by the local People' s Committees, themselves appendages of' the Communist 
Party, exer cised despoti c power throughout the country by holding over 
everyone the threat of prosecution for collaboration with the Nazis . 
6Ibid. 
7Paul E. Zinner, "Marxi sm in Action, " Foreign Affairs, XXVIII (1950), 
p . 652. 
Opposi t i on against the Communi st Party was regarded i n practice as 
punishable by the l ocal poli ce and Peopl e ' s Courts whi ch acted i nde-
pendently of the Mini stry of Justice and the regular courts . 
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As a resul t of the personal insecuri t y t hat exi sted l ocally through-
out Czechosl ovakia, there was littl e expressi on of overt oppos i t i on by 
the anti-Communi sts . The Communi sts used thi s purge power to intimidate 
and s i lence those who opposed their efforts to dominate l ocal public 
opi ni on, and to stimul ate demagogic consensus by arous i ng the anti-Nazi 
hatreds of the masses . The Communi sts were able thus to combine puni t i ve 
powers, rewards and demagogy, under the guise of servi ng a s organs of 
the state, in expanding their power and infl uence as a party. Their 
uninterrupted monopolizat i on of the police apparatus gave them the 
opportunity to buil.d up an independent bureaucracy and mi l itary force 
with whi ch to subvert the State . 
In their anxiety to pose as nat i onalist s and win popul ar esteam., 
Communi st officia l c of the Interior Mini stry conducted the mass expul s i on 
of Germans and Magyars with unnecessary rut h l essness , i nc i ting the Czechs 
and Sl ovaks to unrestrai ned acts of vi ol ence against the persons and 
properties of the minori t i es . I t was part of their policy of act i vati ng 
the masses and br ingi ng them under Communi st direct i on :ror an event ual 
sei zure of power by the party. 8 
The Communi sts al so empl oyed the nat i onal ization pol.icy of the 
Government as a means to destroy thei r polit i cal opponents, to build up 
their i nf'l uence among t he masses , and to place di rect local cont rol over 
the product i ve system of i ndustry ari..d agricult ure i n t he hands of party 
8 J an Stransky, ~ ~~ Prague (New York, 1951), p . 169. 
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cells . The decrees which nationalized the mines and major industries, 
and provided for the conf'iscation of large agricultural holdings and 
lands vn1ich were not farmed directly by the owners, were adopted 
hurriedly by the coalition cabinet, before the democratic parties had 
time to reflect on the consequences of the acts . The decrees were 
supposed to be submitted for approval to the Parliament after general 
e l ections , which were delayed for a year, during which time the Commu-
nists gave legal effect to the provisi onal decrees so as to present the 
Parliament with a ~ accompli . 9 The managerial staff of the nation-
alized enterpri ses was purged and replaced by Communists or persons 
subservient to them. The workers were regimented by a closed shop 
system, which recognized only the Communi st-di rected labor union as 
the bargaining agent of' the workers within the pl.ant . Communist cells 
were quickly organized within the factories to impart political indoc-
trination and guidance to the working force of the factories and mines . 
A similar process of regimentation occurred in the rural areas, where 
the administrators of the land redistributi on policy used their power 
to cons ign land as a means to impose conformity to party wishes among 
the farmers . 
In pla~e of the centralized bureaucratic administration that had 
governed the localities before 1945, the coalition cabinet decreed the 
devolution of administrative competence t o locally constituted Nati onal 
People' s Committees . The democratic parties were induced to accept de-
centralization of the public administration as a democratic reform 
measure, in the belief that the local committees would be representative 
9Hubert Ripka, Czechoslovakia Ensl aved (London, 1950), p . 26. 
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10 of the voters and res:ponsible to the central govermnent . The Commu-
nists, hm-rever, set out to transform these organs of the resistance 
movement into soviets . Broad authority over legislative, executive, 
administrative and judicial matters was delegated by the central govern-
ment to the National People's Committees at provincial, town and village 
levels . nThey were in fact not organs of State administration, but 
replicas of the much exalted communes of Marx, and they embodied a 
fundamental tenet of Marx's revolutionary theory that the working class 
cannot simply lay hold of the ready-ma.de state machinery and wield it 
for its own purposes, but has to smash the bureaucratic-military state 
machinery. 11 11 The committees were to represent the five political 
parti es equally in Bohemia and Moravi a, and two in Slovaki a, according 
to the agreement that had been reached nationally. The l ocal communist s 
profited from their compact organization and political ties with the Red 
Army occupation authorities to secure control of the committees every-
where . The key posts of chairman, police administration and agriculture 
were invari ably occupied by Communists . Elections were never held to 
determine the appropri ate distribution of posts . Through their local 
control of the administrative and judicial organs that were charged with 
the execution of the f'sr -reaching reform policies of the centra l govern-
ment, the Communist s entrenched themselves in power and mobilized great 
numbers of activists to do their bidding by means of demagogy. This 
10 -Anonymous, "The Political Bas is of the People Democracy, 11 
!-i~w ~o~ L1st1 (New York, May 19, 1951) . 
11i>aul E. Zinner, "Marxism in Action, 11 Foreign Affairs , XXVIII 
(1950), p . 647. 
12rvo Duchacek, "The Strategy of Communist Infiltration, 11 World 
Politics, II (1950), p . 360. 
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mobilization of an activist minority, combined with the acquiescence of 
the masses of intimidated groups , constituted the new f orm of "people ' s 
democratic rule," and made elections unnecessary before the spontaneous 
express ion of the people' s will by the activist s . 
The clever tactic of the "united front " of the working class was 
applied to the labor movement a s a means to create unitary organization 
which could be dominated by the Conmrunist trade unionists . The Nazis 
had conveniently destroyed the free labor unions and created an authori-
tarian labor front, which remained intact organizationally in 1945. 
Many of its officers were given political haven from the operation of 
the purge law by enrolling in the party and transforming the union into 
a Communist organization . The pre-Munich labor leaders of democratic 
persuas ion were delayed for many weeks before obtainL11.g their release 
from Nazi concentration camps , thus permitting the Communist s and fellow 
travelers to capture almost complete control of the Labor Front Central 
12 Committee . Of its forty members only f our were opponent s of the 
Communist s . Control of the labor movement gave the Communist s the 
power to order general strikes as a means to obtain their political 
demands, and the power to take over di rect control of all productive 
facilities and services . The workers were organized within the f actories 
into militia brigades and armed by the Ministry of Interior under the 
pretext of protecting nationalized property on behalf of the State . 
Efforts by the Democratic parties in the coalition government to disarm 
the factory militias were not successful during the intervening year s 
that preceded the February 1948 ~ d'etat . The initially strong 
12rvo Duchacek, "The Strategy of Communist In:f'iltration," World 
Politics, II (1950), p . 360 . 
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position of the Comrnunists within the cabinet, and the protective role 
which the Red Army played during 1945, impeded all efforts by the 
democratic parties t o re-constitute the pre-war constitutional order or 
to prevent the creation of de facto revolutionary organs . 13 
The National Front of anti-fascist parties was created in order t o 
provide an orderly restoration of constitutionalism and democracy in 
Czechoslovakia . The connnon program constituted the area of agreement 
and established the immediate goal s of the coalition . After internal 
order and calm had been restored, and the people had become re -accustomed 
t o democratic methods, it was planned to return to the pre-war parlia-
mentary traditions of majority and opposition roles between the parties . 
The Corrmn.1->1i sts took advantnge of the political truce to undermine the 
popul arity of the other parties and extend their awn inf l uence among 
the mass of voters , on the one hand, while simultaneously they sought 
to form a united electoral bloc with the Soci a l Democrat s and National 
Socialist s in order to capture n majority of seats i n the Parliamentary 
elections . In their peculi ar terminol ogy, the C0mrn.unists combined the 
tactics of the united front from below with those of the united front 
14 from above . 
The Carmnunist s used the truce peri od of the Nat iona l Front to 
fashion their organization into a dedicated and disciplined inst rument 
of political conquest . In contrast, the democratic parties appeared 
to be aruateuri sh and naive . The Collllllunist party di sposed of vast sums 
of money which were derived from the sale of war booty that ~he Russ ians 
l3Josef J osten, 9!!., ~ Cou...~try (Chicago, 1950 ), pp . 56- 57. 
14 Bohumil Lausman, Who Was Guilty (Vienna, 1953) , p . 97. 
rel eased, from contributions that were made by the managers of the 
nat i onalized i ndustri es and by capitalists who preferred to pay polit i-
cal blackmail i n return for as surances t hat they would not be prosecuted 
for collaboration with the Nazi s , and from funds which the Ministries of 
Agriculture and Interior raised through their admini stration of confiscated 
propert i es . In an effort to recruit members i nt o the party, the Cornmu-
ni sts welcomed opportuni sts and former collaborators of the Nazi s . Fully 
one-third of the qualified el ectorate was enrolled in the party. The 
new members gai ned protection, mater i al rewards , such a s confiscated 
properti es and jobs , and the illus i on of security, status and power . 15 
The Commun:i.sts hoped t o convert this snowballing popul ar i ty into an 
electoral tri umph and, i f that failed , to bully the Soc i al Democrats 
and National Socialists i nto cooperat i ng with t hem on thei r terms . The 
Soc i al Democrats were ass i duously cultivated by the Communist s through 
the pliable Zdenek Fierlinger, who became the pri me mini ster of the 
coalit i on cabi net and a willing t ool of the Communi st party wi thin the 
Social Democratic party and the cabi net . His mai n task was to hold the 
Soci al Democrats to the policy of uni ted act i on with the Communi sts , so 
the latter could dominate the coalit i on cabinet and win over t he votes 
of t he worki ng c l ass . 16 The Soci a l Democrats were fooled and caj oled 
i nto supporting a policy that led to the shi ft of working class votes 
t o the Communists . By playing second fj.ddle to the Communist party, the 
Social Democrats l ost prestige . The other part ies managed to res i st 
overt dominati on by the Communi st s , but were unable to display the 
15Paul E. Zi nner , "Problems of Communi st Rul e i n Czechoslovakia, " 
World Politics , rv (1951 ), p . 119 . 
16Jan Stransky, ~~~Prague (New York, 1951), pp . 198-200 . 
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aggress iveness and vi gor of the Marxi sts, who were riding the crest of 
the postwar infatuati on. 
The Elections and After 
The propaganda theme of the Czechos l ovak Communists in the electoral 
campaign of 1946 stressed the importance of cement i ng f riendly ties with 
the Sovi et Uuion, and sought to convince the voters that the Communist s 
were better prepared to guarantee thi s foreign policy objective than the 
other parties . To vote against the Con:Linuni sts was shown to constitute a 
r·ejection of Sovi et friendship i n favor of dependence upon the Western 
democracies, which were now less able to offer Czechos l ovakia effective 
security commi tments than they were prepared to in 1938. By stress i ng 
the need Go build a viable security policy by means of a Soviet alliance, 
the Communi sts were able to exploit the mistakes of the democrats to 
their Oim advantage and pose as realistic nati onalists . 17 Through their 
leadership Czechosl ovakia, they claimed, woul d be assured of continued 
nati onal survival, as the Soviet Union could be r elied upon to make 
conJIDon cause with a nati on that placed its confi dence i n a Communi st 
elite, particularly i n vi ew of the geographi cal l ocation and economic 
importance of Czechos lovaki a . Ai'ter seven years of nati onal degradati on 
one could expect such ~n appeal to meet with a favorabl e response . The 
COil.lll1Uni sts also sought to reassure the Czechoslovak electorate that 
their i nternal policy was dedicated to the goal s of socialism and democ-
racy a..'1.d the preservation of constitutiona l government . 18 They posed as 
l7Dana Adan1 Schmidt , Anatomy of~ Satellite (Boston, 1952 ), p . 96. 
18Ibid. 
a legitimate and reformist party instead of one of revolutionary violence. 
In an effort to win the sympat hy of the youth of the nation, t he CoilllllUlli st 
party sponsored an elect oral ref orm that lowered the voting age to e i ghteen, 
and established compulsory voting, in the hope that the "youth vote" and 
the "mass vote" would favor its candidates. The Communists attempted to 
utilize the Red Army as a symbolic instrument vith which to awe the 
voters , by having Soviet military forces pass through the country enroute 
to Austria just before the election day; but the protest of President 
Benes to Stalin succeeded in cancelling the manifestation. 
The outcome of the parliamentary election was surprising, in that 
it revealed how effectively the Marxists, and Coilllllunist s in particular, 
had scored in their efforts to curry popular favor. A majority voted for 
the Marxist candidates, of which thirty-eight per cent voted outright 
Communist in a free election. The organized workers and a high percentage 
of peasants19 supported the Communist party, which represented a s ignif i-
cant shift of political l oyalty away from the constitutional parties. 
Another factor that contributed to the relative loss of the moderate 
party candidates was the convocation early in 1946 by the Ministry of 
Interior of the People's Courts, f or the purpose of trying persons accused 
l 9Ivo Duchacek, 11The Strategy of Communist Infiltration, " World 
Politics , II (1950), p . 364. The peasants before the war habitually 
voted for the Agrarian Party. This political party had been the largest 
in the time of the First Republic . Its chief ideological tenets had 
always been narrowly materialistic, seeking the protection of agrarian 
interests through price controls , farmers' subs idies, and st r ict pro-
tective measures to prevent the importation of agricultural products . 
After several decades of political education by the Agrarian party, the 
peasants became an easy prey to Comrmmist propaganda, when their party 
had been outlawed because of its collaborationist record . "Peasants who 
did not vote for the Communists out of fear of the Ministry of Interior 
voted for them because of the Ministry of Agriculture' s promises II despite 
their anti-collectivist persuas ion and the systematica l warning of other 
parties about the final aims of Communism. 
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of war crimes and collaboration with the Nazis . As a result of the arrests 
and filing of charges by the police , some 300, 000 voters were struck off 
of the electoral roles, thus depriving the democratic parti es of at least 
20 ten seats . 
The Commlmists were nevertheless dissatisfied that they had failed 
to carry an absolute majority of the voters, despite their numerous 
advantages over the other parties . In Slovakia, particularly, they were 
annoyed that the Slovak Democrats had received twice as me.ny votes as 
the Slovak Communist party, despite the l atter ' s active support of regional 
autonomy. The relat ive setback in Slovaki a may have convinced the Commu-
nists of the desultory prospects of gaining hegemony over the other parties 
by constitutional means . 
The new Cabinet differed sli ghtly from its predecessor, the principal 
changes being the substitution of Fierlinger by the Communist leader, 
Klement Gottwald, in the office of Premier, and the addition of the Finance 
and Internal Trade Ministries to those directed by Communists . No change 
was made in the Presidency, as Benes was elected to the supreme office of 
the Republic by the newly elected Constituent Assembly without opposition 
from the Communists . The attent i on of the parties was then shi:rted to the 
Constituti onal Committee of the newly elected Constituent Assembly, where 
democrats and Marxists clashed over the scope and character that was to 
be given to the constitutional guarantees of' freedom and property to the 
individual . The COilllllunists refused to accept the democratic conception 
of making the constitutional guarantees legally binding, and of vesting 
authority to annul statutes , decrees and admini strative acts , which might 
20Hubert Ripka, Czechoslovakia Enslaved (London, 1950), p . 47 . 
contravene the constitutional rights of individuals, in a Constitutional 
Court. They objected in particular to the democratic proposal to allow 
individuals the right to apply to the courts for procedural remedies , 
and to claim civil damages for inf'ringements of their legal rights . Due 
to this fundamental disagreement no agreement was ever reached, and 
progress on the new Constitution was halted. 
The political parties were able to agree on a common economic program 
which emphas ized the development of heavy industry, power and transporta-
tion through a two year recovery plan. To carry out the plan, seventy 
billion Czechoslovak crm,ms were allocated for investment in both nation-
alized and private industries, while the government issued a form.al pledge 
to respect the rights and interests of what remained of the private enter-
prise sector of the economy. The private sector, which included textile 
and footwear manufacturing, was left without adequate sources of credit, 
particularly due to the extreme shortage of foreign exchange. Due to 
the vitriolic propaganda of the Communists against Amer i can "dollar 
imperialism" , the United States declined to advance dollar credit to the 
Czechoslovak goverrunent for investment purposes . 21 This situation made 
the task of private enterprise extremely difficult and added credence to 
the Communist proposals to strengthen commerci al ties with Soviet Russia . 
During the year af'ter the 1946 elections, the influence of the 
Communists subsided slowly, while membership in the democratic parties 
increased. In order to command a parliamentary majority, the Communist-
dominated cabinet was forced to rely upon the support of the Social Demo-
crats, who held slightly more than twelve per cent of the representation. 
21Ib . d 
--2::...·' 
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The Social Democrats became increasingly critical of the Communists after 
the may 1946 electi on, and i ncreasing numbers of them sought t o replace 
Fierlinger as party leader and disengage the party f rom its servile 
alliance with the Communists . The National Socialist and Christian 
Populist pa~cies asserted greater independence and voiced greater opposi-
tion against the domineering role of the Communists during 194 7 . The 
rapid improvement of living conditions, which resulted from the restora-
tion of trade with the western countries , reduced the appeal of the 
Connnunists and increased the prestige of the more liberal parties . Rallies 
and conventions of the democratic parties were well attended and supported 
enthusiastically. There were numerous indicati ons that the Communists 
22 were losing their popularity. 
The peculiar set of circumst ances which had held the disparate poli-
tical coalition together began to break dmm within Czechoslovakia 
simultaneously with the deterioration of relations between the Soviets 
and the Western powers, a s the aims of the Marxi sts conflicted with those 
of t he democrati c parties . 23 Opposition by the Marxi st parties to 
Czechosl ovak participation in the O.E.E. C. prevented the government from 
receiving the bounti ful American economic assi stance offered under the 
Marshall plan. The original decision of the Prague cabi net to accept 
the American i nvitation t o the Paris economic conference in 1947 was 
22Petr Zenlcl, "History of the Communist Coup d ' Etat in Czechoslo-
vakia, 11 Ceske Sl.ovo (February 2, 1958), pp . 1 and 3. At the beginning 
of 1947, foreign trade soared beyond all expectations so the United 
Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration rejected the Czecho-
slovak request for further a.id on the ground that her people were the 
only ones in Europe whose diet was on a pre-war caloric level. 
23Anonymous, "For Democracy--Against St alin," ~ Direction, III 
(No. 3, 1954 ), pp . 21-23 . 
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reversed within two days in consequence of Stalin's remonstrance against 
the political objectives of the Marshall proposals "to assist in the 
return of normal economic health i n the world, without which there can 
be no political stability and no assured pence . 1124 The Connnunist -
directed Information :Ministry charged the United States with aiming to 
restore Germany to her position of power and influence in Europe, and 
projected the policy of' tightening relations with the Soviet Union . The 
heated :foreign policy debate that ensued within the cabinet resulted in 
a victory for the Communists . Fear of diplomatic i solation and of German 
revival, as well as uncertainty over the internal consequences of a 
cabinet crisi s , forced the democratic parties to acquiesce in the decision 
to break with the West . Benes' hope of retaining a "window to the west" 
through an alliance with France was a l so vetoed by Stalin and the Czecho-
s lovak Communist party, which now served as Stalin' s instrument of control 
over the government of Czechoslovakia . 25 This :foreign policy crisis 
proved to be the beginning of the end of the Nat i onal coalition and of 
democracy in the Republic, as the democratic parties wavered and sub -
rnitted before the obvious power of the intrenched Communist apparatus, 
behind which lay the possibility of overt Soviet military intervention. 
The ilmn.ediate consequences of the decision to reject the American 
offer of economic ass i stance through the O. E. E. C. were to place a severe 
strain on available foreign exchange and t o divert trade towards the 
Soviet Union, as a severe drought had necessitated the importation of 
large quantities of grain and forage crops . Another effect was to spur 
the Communists in their efforts to destroy the economic power of the 
24Frederick L. Schuman, International Politics (New York, 1948), p . 819. 
25 ( ) Dana Adam Schmidt, Anatom;x: of~ Satellite Boston, 1952 , p . 103. 
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bourgeois classes, and to undermine the political support of the demo-
cratic partieo. The Communists proposed to levy an extraordinary tax 
on private holdings of over a million crovms to defray the projected 
subsidy to the farmers , whose income had been cut by the drought, and to 
protect the purchasing power of the mass of consumers by importing grain . 
Opposition by the democratic parties was denounced as an effort to pro-
tect the vested interests of the wealthy, and the Communi sts resorted to 
terrorism, for the first time, against the leaders of the democratic 
parties by dispatching time bombs in the mail to three of the National 
26 Socialist ministers . In Sl ovaki a, the Co:mnrunist-controlled police 
a:rrested two leaders of the Democratic party on charges of malfeasance 
and treairnn in performance of their duties on the Executive Board of 
Commissioners--the Sl ovak cabinet . Communists were appointed to the 
Board without serious objections from the Democrats, whi ch merely 
increased the conf'idence of the Communist party i n the substitution of 
27 viol ence for legitimacy a s a technique to monopolize political power . 
The obvious contempt for constitutional democracy, and the calculated 
campaign of the Communists to destroy the independence of t~.<;! democratic 
parties, caused the Social Democratic party to rebel against the leader-
shi p of the Communist stooge, Fi erlinger, who was removed as party chair-
man in favor of Bohumil Lausrnan. Lausman proclaimed his intention t o end 
his party 1 s servility t owards the Communists and to join with the demo-
28 cratic parties in the defense of legality and freedom. By breaking 
26Petr Zenkl, "History of' the Communist Coup d'Etat in Czechos lo-
vakia, " Ceske Slovo (February 2, 1958), p . 3. 
2'7 
'Josef J osten, 2!!_, !1Y:_ Country (Chicago, 1950) , p . 145. 
28Paul E. Zinner, "Marxism in Action, " Foreign Affairs, XXVIII 
(1950) , p . 657. 
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their alliance with the Communi sts, the Social Democrats would depr i ve 
them of their r1..nrrow majority in the government, and threaten to di vi de 
the uni ty of the working cl ass , which was then under Conummiot cont rol 
through the unified labor organization . The example of France und Italy, 
where the Communi sts were neatly cli s l oclged f rom the cabinet coa lition 
iri. April and Nay 1947, created anxiety among the Communi sts i n Czecho-
slovakia and in the Kremlin, l est a s imilar attempt be made i n Prague . 
The Communi sts were a l so di straught over t he rapi d decline i n prest i ge 
that their party wao undergoing, and di d not we l come the pronpect of new 
e l ect i ons, ,rhich wer e due i n the spring of 1948 . The growing c l eavage 
wi th the Soc i al Democrats was i s olating the Communist s , and threatened 
to reduce them to the status of a minority opposition . It was evident 
that t hey could not consolidate their power by democratic means, so 
preparat i ons t o mobilize the act i vists for the establishment of a 
d i ctatorship were made . A national convention of workers and. peasants 
delegates was SU1illl1oned t o meet i n Prague in February 1948, and the 
workers ' milit i a was alerted. 
CIIAPl'E.R r:v 
THE DEMISE OF DEMOCRACY IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA 
Czechoslovakia Between the Power Blocs 
President Benes and Foreign Minister Masaryk were cognizant of the 
deterministic role that geography had upon their efforts to fashion an 
independent foreign policy. Surrotmded by Soviet power on three sides, 
Czechoslovakia could aspire to an independent f'oreign policy only if 
the Western allies and the Soviet Union should maintain their concert 
of power . The dissolution of the wartime coalition would result in the 
creation of a new equilibrium of power in Europe that would make an 
independent Czechoslovakia a geographic impossibility, imb.::,lded as she 
was deeply within the Soviet sphere of influence. President Benes had 
returned to Prague with hopes that he could "persuade the West to turn 
' left' and the Russians to turn 'right' until they all reached the 
1 
political symbiosi s of Communism and western liberalism. " 
Although Benes' hope in continued postwar cooperation bet,reen the 
Western all.ies and the Soviet Union showed some promise during 1945 in 
the approval of the United l'fations Charter, and in the organization of 
the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, the signs 
of' Ea.st-West tension began soon af'ter the Potsdam Con:f'erence . In place 
1s1r Robert Bruce wckhart, ~Happened~~ Czechs (London, 
1953), p . 33 . 
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of a joint, cooperative policy of European re-habilitation, the Western 
allies and the Soviet Union embarked upon competitive policies aiming 
at the r e-divis ion of the world into exclus ive spheres of influence . 
The resulting bipolarization of power made it impossible for t he politi-
cal parties of postwar Czechos lovakia t o co-exist within a democratic 
constitutional order . The Czechoslovak Communists were no longer 
competing solely for political primacy within Czechoslovakia, but were 
ideologically required to advance the interests of the Soviet Union by 
reducing their country t o the status of a Soviet satellite. The 
establishment of' the Cominform in 1947 by the Communist parties of the 
Soviet Union, the east-central European countries and of France and 
Italy s ignalized the end of the era of collaboration between Marxists 
and non-Marxists . The Connnunists in eastern Europe were instructed to 
establish dictatorial regimes and to strengthen their ties ,n.th t he 
Soviet Union. 2 
In one eastern European country a~er the other the Communist 
parties used their bureaucratic powers and their para-military mass 
organizations to impose their exclus ive rule by dissolvipg the non-
Marxi st parties and assimil ating the Marxian Sociali st s , and by wale-
sale arrests and executions o'f political opponents. The Sovietization 
of Bulgaria and Rumania took place in the autumn of 1947, while Hungary 
and Poland succumbed to Communi st dictatorships by the end of the year . 
The more fortunate democratic leaders, l ike Ferenc Nagy and Mikolajczyk, 
escaped to the West, wile many others suffer ed martydom. 3 The diplomatic 
2vratislav Busek, "From Atomic Monopoly to the Atomic Balance, " 
New Yorkske Listy (March J.i., 1958). 
3Hugh Seton-Watson, The F.ast European Revolution (New York, 1956), 
pp. 178 and 199. 
protests of the United States and Great Britain against these violations 
of the Yalta agreements were contemptuously rejected by the Soviet bloc, 
which was bent upon integrating the eastern European zone into the 
Soviet industrial and security set-up . 
The geographic position of Czechosl ovaki a end the economic impor-
tance of the country were valuable assets in terms of Soviet security 
and power requirements . Despite the close ties , which even the demo-
cratic parties had consented t o with the Russians, the Soviet leaders 
could not risk the possibility of having Czechosl ovakia defect to the 
West, or of having her pursue an independent policy. The Soviets have 
sought to integrate the countries within their sphere of influence, not 
only economically and militarily, but also ideologically and politically 
through the Cominform. This policy has led to the t otal subjugat i on 
4 
of the political elites t o the status of satraps of the Kremlin. 
The Coup d'Etat 
The decision t o overthrow the constitutional order of Czechoslovakia 
was probably made between September and December 1947. The Com.inform 
was established in October 1'(47 as an ideol ogi cal and political organ 
to direct the policies of the Communist parties of eastern Europe, 
France, and Italy. Delegates met in November in Milan, Italy, t o discuss 
the political situation in Czechoslovakia, and the Czechoslovak Commu-
nists were apparently instructed to overthrow the constitued democratic 
legal order . 5 
4 
Max Beloff , "No Peace , No War," Foreign Affairs, XXVII (1949), 
pp . 222-223 . 
5v1adimir Krajina, "How Did It Happen," Svobodny Zitrek (February 
15, 1949) . 
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The democratic parties of Czechoslovakia failed to perceive the 
motives and objectives of the Comnrunists during nearly three years of 
coalition government . Democratic opinion interpreted Communist ruonopo-
lization of key administrative positions within the government as 
simply political zeal to direct the policies of land reform, punishraent 
of traitors and collaborators, and defense of working class interests 
6 in industry and commerce. It was felt that, had the Communists wished 
to impose one-party rule over the country, they could have done so 
initially in 1945 with Red P.,rmy support . The Communists, however, had 
several valid reasons for acting conscientiously within the National 
Front from 1945 to February 1948. The Soviet Union could not risk a 
breakdovm in its relations with the Western allies in 1945, at a time 
when Russ ia vras exhausted and Western armies were poised for acti on in 
Central Europe. Later, the possession of the atom bomb by the United 
States restrained the Soviets from. precipitating a break with the West 
until 1947, when the Soviet foreign minister announced that Russia had 
exploded an atomic device and was capable of producing atomic bombs . 
Another reason for delaying the~ d'etat in Czechoslovakia was the 
necessity to train Communist administrators for the tasks of managing 
the bureaucratic apparatus.7 
The Czechoslovak democratic parties failed similarly t o interpret 
the determinants of Soviet foreign policy properly. They continued to 
believe in t he "hands off" policy of' Stalin after the objective condi-
tions of inter-allied cooperation had ended the utility to the Soviet 
6 Sir Robert Bruce Lockhart , What Happened t o the Czechs (London, 
1953), p. 31. 
7Klement Gottwald, Forward, Not ~ Step~ (Prague, 1948 ), p . 122. 
Union of such a policy, and they foolishly misinterpreted the wartime 
tactics of Stalin to s i gnify the abandonment by the USSR of its i deo-
l ogi cal imperialism.8 Had they realized the purely e~edient natw.~e of 
Soviet tactics and t he constancy of Marxi st determinants, the Czecho-
s lovak democratic parties might haV') been better prepared to meet the 
revolutionary actions of the Communists in February 1948. Benes' hope 
that the Communi st ~; would support hi s effort t o make Czechoslovakia an 
ideological and political 11bridge between East and West 11 and a laboratory 
to synthesi ze liberalism and socialism proved to be utopian. Equally 
unrealistic was Benes' opinion that the democratic heritage of the pre-
war period and the revulsion agai nst Nazism would forestall acceptance 
of authoritarian rule by the people . The idea that the Commm1i st s might 
attempt a putsch against the democrati c state appeared to be sheer 
fantasy to the leaders of the democratic parties . They were so accustomed 
to parliamentary and electoral competition that they failed to conceive 
of' the possibility that the Communist s would resort t o illegal violence 
t o impose their f iat upon the nation. They mi s i nterpreted Marxi st 
expediency in the employment of parliamentarism as a tactic to signi fy 
Communist conversion to the rules of democrati c fair play. 9 
The Political Bureau of the Czechoslovak Communist party met on 
January 20, 1948, to f ix the date for the revol utionary putsch. I t was 
decided that preparati ons woul d be complete by the end of February . 
From mid-January, 191~8 on, the Communi st rewspaper Rude Pravo enclosed 
its dateline in a series of alternately col ored squares, which served as 
8 Ivo Duchacek, "The February Coup i n Czechos l ovaki a , 11 World Politics, 
II (1950), p . 531. 
9Ibi d . 
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a code to its readers . 10 Within the cabinet the Conununists found them-
selves increasingly i solated on controversial policy decis ions , as the 
Social Democratic ministers joined the non-Marxist minisJ.:;ers . Among the 
controversi al questions which were deliberated in Feb.t'uary, 1946, was the 
civil service bill . The Co11wunists were defeated in their effort to 
purge the civil service of 11politically unreliable" officials, and t o 
use discriminatory salary scales to reward the politically reliable civil 
servants . The Communist secretary of the Central Labor Council, Zapotocky, 
acting under instructions formulated by the Communist party secretariat , 
convened a congress of workers' delegates , who represented the action 
conmrl.ttees of' the laboring classes . The cabinet reject ion of the Commu-
ni st proposal s for the civil service bill served as a preteArt for the 
mobi lization of the workers' soviet . 11 
The controversy which shook the cabinet and led to the collapse o:f 
the national Front was precipitated by the Minister o:f Justice, Prokop 
Drtina, a member of the National Socialist party. At a cabinet meeting 
of February 13, 1948, Drtiua presented a form.al list of charges against 
the Communist minister of interior, which accused him of having trans-
formed the police into a brutal and illegal instrument of the Communist 
12 party. In particular, the list of charges accused the interior minister 
of having enlisted into the police forces a large number of Communist 
activists, of having arrested and tortured political opponents, of having 
compil.ed a blacklist of all non-Connnunist civil nnc'l military personnel, 
10vratislav Busek, ~ Lesson of ~ February Coup d 'Etat (New York, 
1954), p . 71. 
11rcubert Ripke, Czechosl ovakia Ensl aved (London, 1950), p . 189. 
12 Josef J osten, ~~ Country (Chicago, 1950 ), p . 174 . 
and of extorting false evidence from numerous victims of arrest for the 
pu.rpose of incriminating the leaders of the Nat ional Socialist party. 13 
During the meet ing of the cabinet, a report "Was received by the justice 
minister that the interior ministry had discharged eight key police 
officials in the capital, entrusted with the care of arms and ammunit i on, 
and replaced them with Communists . The ensuing discussion became so 
heated that a censure motion against the interior minister was carried 
and a majority of the ministers approved a cabinet order instructing 
the i nterior minister to reinstate the regular police officials . 14 
The non-Communist mini sters perceived the conspiracy which the 
Communists were plotting against the legal order and drew together to 
prevent the illegal seizure of power . They protested publicly i n the 
press and before the constituent assembly and attempted t o arouse public 
res i stance against the impending coup . The democratic ministers were 
awaiting compliance by the interior minister with the cabinet resolution 
to restore the key police officials . I f the order was not enforced, the 
prime minister, Klement Gottwald, would be responsible, both as chairman 
of the cabinet and chairman of the Communist party, and the majority 
groups could introduce a censure motion before the constituent assembly, 
acting a s provisional parliament , t o force the prime minister ' s resigna-
tion . Parliamentary censure would authorize the president, Dr . Benes, 
to dismiss the entire cabinet and appoint a new one . 
The Communists were aware that the crisis was at hand before they 
were prepared to act in accordance with their revolutionary schedul e , so 
they unleashed a violent propaganda attack against the democratic parties, 
13 Ibid . , p . 175. 
14 
Survey 1947-1948, p . 154. 
accusing them of plotting to seize control of the goverru,~ent in the 
interest of' the Western powers and the reactionary classes . The 
epithets "enemy of the people" and "enemy of the working class 11 were 
hurled at the defenders of constitutional government by the Communist 
press. Communist speakers, addressing mass meetings of' organized 
workers, threatened the democratic parties that "the time has come to 
learn that the patience of' the working class has its limits , " and 
Zapotocky, the trade union leader, was quoted in ~ Pravo as having 
:proclaimed to the working class: "Away with the Parliament which does 
not fulfill the program o:f the Trade Unions . "15 
The crescendo of Communist propaganda was accompanied by stepped-
up preparations for the putsch. Two regiments of Communist security 
police, secretly trained in the Soviet Union, were alerted by the 
Communists for co-ordinated action with the workers' militias . The 
Communist political bureau was convened permanently for two meet ings 
each day at the residence of the party chairman and prime minister, 
Gottwald, who remained. in constant telephone co:mnnn1ication with the 
Soviet embassy, the Cominform secretariat , and the Kremlin, as well a s 
th ·t 1· 16 e secur1 y po ice. 
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The Soviet deputy foreign minister, Valerian Zorin, was invited by 
Gottwald to Prague, ostensibly to be present at the inaugurat ion of the 
Czechoslovak-Soviet Friendship Society, scheduled on February 22, 1948, 
15vrat i s l av Busek, The Lesson of ~ February Coup d 'Etat (New York, 
1954), p . 71. 
16Bohumil Lausman, ~ ~ Guilty (Vienna, 1953), p. 106 . At the 
r irst emergency meet ing of the Politbyro the Communist Minister of 
Information quoted Lenin' s statement : "If we want to make an orne let, 
we must break eggs . " 
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but in reality to supervise the seizure of power . l 7 Action committees 
were suddenly formed by the Communist cells within every factory, office, 
school, and bureau, with instructions to seize the premises in which they 
were employed at the appointed hour . The preparations for the ~ were 
accelerated, so as to counter the threat of parliamentary censure and 
presidential dismissal by the seizure of t otal power . 
In order to insure execution of the Cabinet resolution against the 
interior minister, the non-Communist ministers informed President Benes 
of their determination t o resign unless the prime minister conformed to 
the wishes of the cabinet majority to reinstate the police officials 
and prevent the conmrunization of the police forces . Prime Minister 
Gottwald also called upon the president to protest against what he re-
garded as an attempt by the non-Communist ministers to force the cabinet 
to resign anc1 in order to form a new cabinet without Communist partici-
pation. Benes assured Gottwald that he would not appoint a cabinet which 
excluded t he participation of Conmnmist ministers , but he also ins i sted 
that the prime minister enforce the will of the cabinet majority on all 
18 policy matters . Gottwald was adamant in his oppos ition to the demands 
of the cabinet majority that the non-political police administrators be 
reinstated, and that the security police be kept f ree of political ties 
with the Communist party. He sought to evade the demand of the president 
that he conform to the wishes of the cabinet majority by winning over 
the Social Democrats . 19 As an inducement t o the latter for their support 
l7Vladimir Krajina, "How Did It Happen 11 , Svobodny Zitrek (February 6, 
1949), pp. 103. 
18 Ja.romir Smutny, ~ February Coup d 'Etat, I (London, 1957), pp . 15-16. 
19 Ibid. , p . 24 . 
on the controversial police question, Gottwald proposed that Communist s 
and Socialists f'orm a new cabinet which would exclude the other parties . 
Ile offered two-fifths of the cabinet positions to the Socia l Democrats 
in such a two-party government, but the latter refused to be divided 
from the democratic parties, and demanded that the former police adminis -
trators be restored to their commands. Gottwald became so i ncensed at 
the refusal of the Social Democrats t o become accessories to his dicta-
torial scheme that he threat ened dire reprisals agai nst them for placing 
bourgeois democratic ideals ahead of the class interest of the proletariat . 20 
The deadlock cont i nued until February 20, 1948, when the twelve 
ministers representing the National Socialist, Christ i an Populist, and 
Sl ovak Democrat parties submitted their resignations from the cabinet 
to President Benes, and demanded that be dismiss the prime minister and 
the other ministers, and appoint an interim cabinet of civil servants to 
administer parliamentary elections . They hoped to improve their represen-
tation sufficiently so that they might f'orm a democratic cabinet, with 
the exclusion of the Communists and Social Democrats , or offer to include 
the Social Democrats in a broader coalition that would insure democracy 
and be able to reach some a&Teement on the text of a new constitution. 
The democratic parties erred in not securing the participation of the 
Social Democrats, for without the Soc i a l Democrats they constituted only 
one -half of the cabinet, and therefore, could not legally bring about 
the parliamentary censure or presidential dismissal of the cabinet . 21 
Prime Minister Gott"Wald took advantage of the voluntary resignations 
of the democratic ministers, and of the fact that these constituted only 
20Ibid. 
2111Five Years Ago," Skutecnost, V (1953), p . 7. 
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one-half of the cabinet to demand presidential acceptance of the resig-
nations , and the appointment of additional Cor:rmunists to the posts . 
President Benes refused to accept the resign.a.tions,which were legitimate 
protests against the illegal conduct of the interior minister and the 
prime minister . The protesting ministers continued to direct their 
ministries during the crisis, as their tenure was valid legally until 
the presidential appointment of successor s . 
The impasse which resulted from Gottwald's refusal to errforce the 
cabinet resolution and Benes' insistence upon com:pliance infuriated the 
Communist leader and prime minister . Gottwald thereupon del.ivered a 
public address t o a mass meeting of Comnrunist S1...'Pporters in Prague, in 
whi ch he demanded presidential acceptance of the resignations and appoint-
ment of Communist ::; t o the cabinet . He warned the president that the 
national security police was prepared to execute his order, if need be, 
"against the reactionary and subyersive elements," which was taken to 
22 
mean anyone who dared to oppose the Communist party. The following day, 
February 22, Gottwal,i addressed the opening meet ing of the delegates to 
the Congress of Workers ' Committees in Prague, the hastily convoked and 
extra-legal sov±et, and he again appealed to the President t o accept 
the resignations of the twelve democratic ministers who had precipitated 
the cabinet crisis . He warned Benes that the "agents of domestic and 
forei gn reaction must no l onger be admitted into the government" and that 
dismissal of the democratic ministers was now "the only way to avoid 
disorder and chaos . "23 
22 
J osef J osten, Oh,~ Country (Chicago, 1950), p . 193 . 
23 ( ) 8 Hubert Ripka, Czechoslovakia Enslaved London, 1950, p . 23 -239. 
The pressures upon President Benes were now very great, for he was 
being asked to either surrender absolute control over the government to 
the Communi sts or take the risk of disrais s ing the entire cabinet and 
thus oust the Communist s from the government . The workers ' congress was 
serving the Communists as a public forum for revolutionary demands--total 
nationalization of industry, further re-distribution of farm.land, and 
sun:pension of all decreer.; i ssuecl by the supreme adnini strative cou.....-t 
which interfcrred with the arbitrary orders of the Communist administra-
. f · i 1 24 . h tive o ·fic as . The soviet thundered approval oft ese demagogic 
demands in the noisy sess ions which were broadcast to the nation. The 
pres ident was disturbed, but he refused. to be i ntimidated by the Communist 
party and its extra- legal soviet, and. again insi sted that the cabinet 
conform to the will of its majority, and work together until a new parlia-
ment could be elected. He made a plea that the pa...,-.t,ies respect the 
democratic ord.er and the rule of law. 
Benes hes i tated t o employ his extraordinary powers of dismissal and 
re-appointment of the cabinet, and parliamentary dissolution, until he 
could. appraise the positions of the major foreign powers --the Soviet 
Union and the United States . The Soviet government stood squarely behind 
Gottwald in the cris i s . Deputy Foreign Minister Zorin was sent to Prague 
to inform the Czechoslovak goverrunent that the Kremlin intended to back 
the prime I!linister, with f orce i f necessary, in order to prevent the 
government from falling into the hands of "reactionary elements" which 
would be "hostile to the Sovi et Union . "25 The Soviet newspapers, Pravda 
24Toid . 
25Jose~ Josten, 2£., ~ Country (Chicago, 1950), p . 193 . 
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and I zvestije., were quoted by the Czech Communist paper, Rude Pravo, as 
having declared the complete support of the Soviet Union for the 11heroi c 
f ight of the Conmruni st party of Czechoslovakia for freedom and i ndepen-
dence . " Radio Moscow broadcast itn solidarity with the "people" against 
the "reactionaries . n26 To clinch the matter of where the Kremlin stood, 
Soviet armed forces from Germany and Austria were sunnnoned to position 
on the borders of Czechoslovakia. for what appeared to be a general in-
vasion and occupation of the country should Gottwald request Russian 
intervention . Benes was convinced of the determine.tion of the Soviets 
to intervene should he act against Gottwald.27 He sought advice from 
the Ameri can ambassador, Stei nhardt, who had been ordered back from 
Washington to Prague with an offer of a loan of twenty million dollars 
f or the purchase of cotton. Ambassador Steinhardt could offer no assur-
ances of American military support against a Comnrunist putsch or Soviet 
intervention. He explained that "the non-Communists or democrats could 
not expect direct or indirect a id f r om the United States i n case of a 
28 showdovm between Communists and non-Communists" , as the United States 
was not prepared to risk the possibility of hostilities with the Soviet 
Union. Benes' hands were thus tied. Czechoslovakia was again i sol ated 
diplomatically and helpless militarily in the face of the vaEt array of 
internal and external Communist armed forces , which now presented him 
with an ultimatum t o surrender the democratic State or be crushed--the 
same terms he had received f r om Hitler i n 1938. 
26Ibid. , pp . 127-129. 
27Bohumil Lausman, Who Was Guilty (Vienna, 1953), p . 216. 
28nana Adam Schmidt, Anatomy of!!. Satellite (Boston, 1952 ), p . 110. 
The streets of Prague were transformed into a permanent encampment 
of Communists, who mobilized their police regiments and workers' militia 
battalions . The latter were i ssued weapons by the illegally appointed 
district police commandants, and all public buildings, key points and 
essential services were quickly occupied by armed men, acting under 
orders of the minister of interior. The minister of inf'ormati on seized 
control of all the media of communications , and prevented the president 
from addressing the nation by radio, which was allowed to broadca Jt only 
Communist propagana.a.29 The telephone and telegraph services were placed 
under strict censorship, and non-Communi st newspapers were forced to 
cease publication by the general strike of workers , who continued to 
print and distribute the Communist press only. Throughout Prague, only 
the Communist s had knowledge of what wa.s transpiring and the means to 
prepare for coordinated political action. The action committees, which 
had been f ormed by the Communist cells within every office, :factory and 
bureau, suddenly sei zed control of the reins of management, within every 
business enterprise, public service and government off'ice and ousted the 
legal management . The members of the action committees were armed and 
were supported by detachments of the workers ' militia. 3o The capital 
was under the occupation of armed Communists , and resembl ed a city under 
a state of seige, while Soviet troops were massed at the frontiers in 
readiness to crush any ref.iistance that might be offered by the Czecho-
s l ovak army. The regular army was ordered to remain in its barracks by 
29Vladimir Krajina , "How Did It Happen , " Svobodny Zitrek 
(February 6, 1949). 
3oivo Duchacek, "The February Coup in Czechos lovakia, 11 World 
Politics , II (1950) , p . 525. 
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the defense minister, General Svoboda, who was a Communi st stooge . Two 
additional high ranking officers who had served the Benes government-in-
exile were stripped of their collll!l.ands . The officer corps of the army 
was therefore neutrali zed by the Communists, while the ra."lks were un-
informed of' what was transpiring. The president was therefore deprived 
of his cozm:nand over the armed forces and left alone and helpless to face 
the prime minister ' s demands . 
The police then began to carry out o. pre-arraD..ged campai gn of terror 
by arresting all persons whose names appeared on Communist purge lists . 
An effort by university students to st age a march against Communist 
terrorism and arouse mass public opposition in defense of l egality and 
democracy vras quickly dispersed by the security police . The city was 
gripped with fear by the methodical terrorism of the Co.amrunist police 
apparatus, which began the :manhunt for its hapless opponents . 31 
Gottwald held the capital in the grip of his armed followers , and 
the pres ident became his pri soner in the pres ident i al pal ace; yet the 
Coilll..nu.~ist leader was determined to impose his will upon the president by 
legitimate means . Since Benes had refused categorically to accept the 
res i gnati on of the twelve ministers , or to authori ze the appointment of 
new minister s without the consent of the parliamentary maj ority, Gottwald 
was forced to secure the collaboration of the Soci al Democrat s , whose 
added representati on i n parli ament assured the Communi sts of a bare 
majority. A mob was di rected to invade the premises of the Soci a l 
Democratic headquarters, where the members of the executive committee 
were deposed and replaced by an action committee composed of left -wing 
Social Democrats headed by Fierlinger , who again assumed leadership of 
the party. 32 The action cormnittee then expelled the right-wing Soci al 
Democratic minister, Majer, for having opposed Gottwald and re-constituted 
its representation in the Cabinet . A number of opportuni st s were found 
among the deputies of the democratic parties to accept appointment t o 
the re- organi zed Gottwald cabinet , which now ws dominated by the 
Communists . Rank and f ile members of parliament were intimidated into 
passive support of the Gott~,ald cabinet , which required formal appointment 
for the new ministers by the president . The minister of interior i s 
reputed to have warned Benes that refusal on his part to sign the new 
appointments would result i n the liquidation of a long list of victims, 
many of whom could be presumed to be in the hands of the security police . 33 
The justice minister, Drtina, long- time friend and former secretary of 
the President, had already leaped to his death to escape Communist 
vengeance, while the President ' s brother had been savagely beaten by a 
mob . The nation was even more helpless than it had been in 1938, for 
the enemy of the state now held absolute power over the government , the 
police, the army, and over the mobs which controlled the cities, and it 
held in reserve across the border the hordes of mechanized Red Army men . 34 
President Benes submitted to the ultimatum of the prime minister 
on February 25, 1948, as he had submitted ten years before to the demands 
of Hitler . The enfeebled statesman had been stricken twice recently by 
heart attacks, and he realized the futility of resistance to the array 
32Dana Adam Schmidt, Anatomy of~ Satellite (Boston, 1952), p . 117. 
33survey 1947-1948, p . 155. 
34Paul W. Blackstock, 11 Indirect Aggress ion," Soviet Total War I 
(Washington, 1956}, pp . 35-36 . - -
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of force which held total power before him. What saddened him most, 
however, was the sight of the regimented and bloodthirsty masses, 
behaving a s the Nazis, submitting blindly to the leadership of unprinci-
palled demagogues, and destroying the democratic edifice on which he 
had labored for a lifetime. 
CHAPI'ER V 
CONCWSION 
The demise of democracy in Czechoslovakia in February 1948 was the 
result of a gradual process of disintegration of the diplomatic bases of 
Czechoslovak security. Although the coup d ' etat 'Which interred consti-
tutional democracy in central Europe ' s model republic was executed by 
internal revolutionary action under the direction of the Cormnunist party, 
the preponderance of the Connnunist s in 1948 was the product of a decade 
of Western diplomatic failures and defeats . 
The succession states of east- central Europe were created by fiat 
of the victorious Allied and Associated powers in 1919 ostensibly to 
satisfy the l ocal yearnings of the region for independence and Wilson ' s 
principle of self determination. French and British support of this 
policy, however, was motivated by the objective of creating a viable 
power equilibrium for the purpose of containing Germany and Soviet Russi a 
and of insuring Anglo-French preponderance in Europe . The new states of 
east-central Europe were thus conceived of by the French, in particular, 
as devices to buttress French security and the new status ~ that 
emanated f'r om the Versailles settlement . The new states were far too 
feeble t o defend themselves against a resurgent Germany or Russia with-
out the military protection of the French and British, who formed the 
concert of power which was to function through the League of Nations . 
From the beginning of her existence almost, Czechoslovaki a looked 
to France and Great Britain for guarantees of protection against her 
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revisionist neighbors, in return for which she was ready to perform. her 
obligations in defense of the status quo and balance of power which 
exalted Anglo-French hegemony over Europe . The security of Czechoslovakia 
and of the other east European succession states was indivisible with 
that of France and Great Britain. The national interest of all was 
designed by the peace settlement to coincide in the defense of the 
status quo and the power preponderance of the Versailles powers . 
The brea.kdmm of the Versailles settlement upon which the security 
and independence of Czechoslovakia depended began with the rise to po,.rer 
of Hitler in Germany and the alienation of Italy and Soviet Russia by 
France and Great Brita.in. Hitler ' s successful defiance of France i n the 
Rhineland crisis led to the re-armament of Germany, her alliance with 
Italy, and to a rapid reversal of power relations in Europe . Anglo-French 
preponderance was transformed into Italo-German preponderance by 1938. 
The power equilibrium upon which the defense of the territorial Gtatus quo 
depended could be restored only by the conclusion of an Anglo-French-
Soviet alliance, the tightening of ties by these powers with the east-
central European countries wilic11 supported the Versail.les peace, and an 
accelerated program of military re-armament. If' these measures proved 
to be inadequate to restrain the Axis powers a preventive war alone could 
have preserved the national security of the status quo bloc . 
The conservative leaders of Great Britain and France chose the 
policy of accomodating the territorial demands of Germany and Italy 
through a series of compensations which sacrificed the existence of such 
states as Ethiopia, Austria, Czechoslovakia and Alba11ia and allowed such 
states as Spain and Rumania to be drawn into the Axis sphere of influence. 
They hoped to re-create a new concert of power cons i sting of the Big Four, 
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excluding Soviet Russia from any voice in European political decisions . 
The motivation behind this anti-Soviet policy was in part to i solate 
the Soviets and contain their power, and in part to avoid the neces sity 
of submitt ing to the social demands of the working class that would be 
made in consequence of a policy of military re-armament and preparation 
for war . The appeasement policy was conceived of by Western conserva-
tives as a means to avoid internal accomodations in :favor of the working 
class, and as a means to prevent the expansion of Soviet power and 
influence. 
The price t o Czechoslovakia of the Anglo-French policy of appease-
ment was national extinction. Czechoslovak patriot s never fully recovered 
from the Munich betrayal, for which they blamed the Western democracies . 
In search of defenders of their national interest they turned to the 
Soviet Union, whose 'W'Srtime exploits against the Germans and pan~Slavism 
created the illusion among patriotic Czechoslovaks that Russia could be 
trusted to respect their independence and institutions. Stalin' s 
dissolution of the Comintern convinced Benes that the Soviet Union had 
abandoned its ideological goal of exporting communism, and that her 
interests were no longer incompatible with the national survival of an 
independent Czechoslovakia . 
During the course of the war against Hitler Germany it became 
evident that the expulsion of the Nazis from Czechoslovakia would be 
accomplished by the Red Army, particularly after allied strategy had 
decided to leave east-central Europe a sphere for Soviet military 
operations . Czechoslovakia was destined, by allied agreements, t o 
come under Russian military occupation. This decis ion by the Western 
powers forced Benes and other east-European leaders to collaborate on 
Moscow's terms in the restoration of national governments to their countries. 
The Western allies were reluctant during the war to engage the Russians 
in controversial political discussions concerning east-central Europe, for 
fear that the Soviet government might negotiate a separate peace vith 
Nazi Germany. Such understandings as ·were worked out between the Big 
Three leaders at the Teheran and Yalta conferences conceded to the Soviet 
Union the substance of hegemony over all of' east-central Europe . This 
recognized power status gave the Russ ians a legitimate claim to interfere 
in the political composition of the east-central European governments 
duriri..g the postwar period. 
The inclusion of Communist s in the key positions of the Czechoslovak 
government was the price which Benes was forced to pay for Russia' s 
contribution t o the war against Hitler Germany. This opening wedge trans -
formed the Czechoslovak Communist party into a state within a state . The 
psychological attitude of the Czechos lovak working class, which provided 
the Communist s with the mass support to carry out their coup d'etat 
successfully in February 1948, can be traced to the moral dis illusionment 
which swept Czechosl ovakia after Munich and left the mass of people 
bitterly resentful against Western democracy and its Czechoslovak votaries . 
Finally, the failure on the part of the United States and Great Britain 
to provide President Benes and Foreign Minister Masaryk with t angible 
assurances of military assi stance during the February cris i s allowed the 
Communist s to use the protective cover of the Red Army as a shield behind 
which they neutralized the internal role o:f the Czechoslovak army. 
The demi se of democr acy in Czechos lovakia was thus the product of the 
diplomatic blunder s and nai vete of West ern st at esmen as much, i f not more, 
than of the shortcomings of Dr . Benes and the Czechoslovak democrat s . 
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